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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the grant of the trial court (Honorable John R. 
Anderson of the Eighth Judicial District Court in and for Duchesne County, 
Roosevelt Division, State of Utah (the "Trial Court")) of a post-remand 
summary judgment and final judgment. This Court has jurisdiction to 
decide this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(a) Did the Trial Court err in not construing the limited facts 
available to it in the light most favorable to Leo W. Hardy, M.D. ("Dr. 
Hardy") as the nonmoving party? 
(b) Did the Trial Court err in not allowing the jury to determine the 
reasonableness of the duration of the contract? 
(c) Did the Trial Court err in not allowing additional discovery to 
develop the record so the scope of the "just clause" provision could be fairly 
determined? 
(d) Did the Trial Court err in not allowing the jury to determine 
whether or not Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC") had "just cause" to 
terminate Dr. Hardy? 
Standard of Review: The Trial Court's application of law to the 
undisputed facts in summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Trujillo 
2 
v. Utah Dep't. of Tramp., 1999 UT App 227, \\2, 986 P.2d 752. Further, 
"[i]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [ ] the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" are viewed "in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, 
Inc., 2000 UT 71,1J15, 10 P.3d 338. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The decision in this appeal is governed by common law and thus no 
statutes, constitutional provisions, ordinances, or rules are determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceeding, and Disposition Below 
This is a breach of contract case involving a professional services 
contract for pathology services (the "Agreement") entered into by Dr. Hardy 
and UBMC.1 The Agreement, executed on November 29, 1994, recited no 
termination date, but instead was terminable "for just cause." Dr. Hardy 
performed under the Agreement to the complete satisfaction of all 
concerned, i.e., doctors, patients, medical staff, and UBMC administration. 
No member of the UBMC administration or medical staff ever expressed 
any concern whatsoever over Dr. Hardy's performance between November 
1
 A true and correct copy of Dr. Hardy's contract is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit "A". 
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of 1994 and July of 1996 UBMC terminated the Agreement on July 18, 
1996. 
In the spring of 1996, Dr. Thomas J. Allred ("Dr. Allred") contacted 
UBMC to inquire whether UBMC would be interested in hiring a full time 
pathologist who was also certified as an emergency room physician. UBMC 
invited Dr. Allred to visit the hospital and shortly thereafter, on July 18, 
1996, the UBMC Board of Trustees ("the "Board") voted to terminate Dr. 
Hardy's contract and to offer Dr. Allred a position as director of pathology 
and part-time emergency room physician. 
UBMC gave Dr. Hardy 90 days written notice of termination on July 
29, 1996, without giving any reason in the letter for terminating the 
Agreement. When Dr. Hardy objected that UBMC did not have just cause to 
terminate the Agreement, UBMC filed a declaratory judgment action 
seeking to determine the parties' rights under the Agreement. The parties 
filed-cross motions for summary judgment on Dr. Hardy's breach of 
contract claim, which were both denied on October 19, 1998. After the 
completion of discovery, the parties agreed to stipulated facts and refiled 
motions for summary judgment on the legal question of whether Dr. Hardy's 
"just cause" contract was enforceable under Utah law. 
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The Trial Court heard oral arguments on the renewed motions for 
summary judgment and ruled from the bench that Dr. Hardy's "just cause" 
contract was enforceable under Utah law, and the question of whether 
UBMC had just cause to terminate the Agreement was for the jury to decide 
as a question of fact. The Trial Court then allowed the parties to file 
additional briefs on the issue of whether successor UBMC boards could be 
bound by the Agreement or whether the Agreement was voidable by a 
successor board. On April 6, 2000, the Trial Court ruled that the Agreement 
could not be enforced against UBMC's successor Boards. The Trial Court 
further ruled that because the eleven-member Board in place when the 
Agreement was terminated had three new members, it was a successor 
Board and hence it could terminate the Agreement at any time. On that 
basis, the Trial Court denied Dr. Hardy's renewed motion for summary 
judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of UBMC. 
On June 1, 2000, Dr. Hardy filed a Notice of Appeal, thereby 
appealing the Trial Court's order and judgment granting Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment entered on May 18, 2000. On August 30, 2002, the 
Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion holding that because the contract 
involved a proprietary function, it was enforceable against successor boards 
if the contract was for a reasonable duration. See Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. 
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Hardy, 2002 UT 92, 1J18, 54 P.3d 1165, a copy of which is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit "B". The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case 
back to the Trial Court instructing the court to develop the record and to 
determine the scope of the "just cause" provision. 
On February 18, 2003, UBMC filed its Post Remand Motion for 
Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion to Bifurcate. On April 
15, 2003, Dr. Hardy filed his Opposition to the Post Remand Motion for 
Summary Judgment, requesting, inter alia, that additional discovery be 
taken in order to develop the record pursuant to the Supreme Court's 
direction on remand. The Trial Court did not allow additional discovery and 
granted UBMC's Post Remand Motion for Summary Judgment by Ruling 
dated June 12, 2003 (the "Ruling").2 See R. 1624-26, in which the Court 
held that the contract "cannot be viewed as including a reasonable 
duration." (R. 1625). The Court also concluded that "the intended scope of 
the just cause clause provided limited discretion to future boards, and is 
unusual when comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to other contracts typically 
entered into by Uintah Basin Medical Center with other medical 
professionals, and as such the contracts duration was unreasonable making 
the contract unenforceable, . ." (R. 1625). 
A true and correct copy of the Ruling is included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit "C". 
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The Trial Court made its decision based on no additional discovery, 
even though Dr. Hardy requested additional depositions, and the Utah 
Supreme Court ordered development of the record. Dr. Hardy did, however, 
submit a declaration regarding his understanding of the "just cause" 
provision in compliance with the Utah Supreme Court's opinion. See R. at 
1546.3 The Trial Court dismissed Dr. Hardy's declaration as self-serving, 
not as an attempt to develop the record as ordered by the Utah Supreme 
Court. In addition, the Trial Court did not allow the taking of Dr. Wayne T. 
Stewart's ("Dr. Stewart") deposition, another physician at UBMC whose 
contract terms closely mirrored Dr. Hardy's. The Trial Court simply 
dismissed this contract as "atypical." Notwithstanding, the Trial Court 
opined that "when comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to other medical 
professionals typically entered into by Uintah Basin Medical Center, the 
vast majority of those contracts provide a specific duration, and a provision 
allowing either party to terminate the contract after giving the appropriate 
notice." (R. 1624-25). Dr. Hardy was not allowed to conduct discovery in 
an effort to explain the reasons for the language in his contract. The Trial 
Court's refusal to allow additional discovery is in complete disregard of the 
Utah Supreme Court's directive to the Trial Court to develop the record. 
3
 A true and correct copy of Dr. Hardy's declaration is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit "D". 
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On July 31, 2003, Dr. Hardy, by and through his counsel, filed a 
Notice of Appeal from the final judgment dated July 10, 2003 of the 
Honorable John R. Anderson, Eighth Judicial District Court of Duchesne 
County, Roosevelt Division.4 
Statement of Facts 
1. Dr. Hardy is a board certified pathologist. (R. 189). 
2. UBMC is the business name for Duchesne County Hospital, which 
is owned by Duchesne County and operated by UBMC's Board of Trustees. 
(R. 304). 
3. On November 29, 1994, Dr. Hardy and UBMC entered into the 
Agreement in which Dr. Hardy agreed to provide professional services for 
UBMC as director of the hospital's pathology laboratory and to perform 
related duties. The language of the Agreement was taken from a contract 
between UBMC and Dr. Joseph J. Sannella ("Dr. Sannella")(a pathologist at 
UBMC who immediately preceded Dr. Hardy). Dr. Hardy modified the 
contract slightly and returned the edited contract to UBMC. The Agreement 
was then typed onto Duchesne County Hospital letterhead and signed by 
Bradley D. LeBaron, who was UBMC's administrator and who had authority 
to enter into personal service contracts on UBMC's behalf. Although the 
A true and correct copy of the Judgment is included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit "E". 
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Agreement was executed on November 29, 1994, it became effective August 
1, 1994, the date upon which Dr. Hardy first began providing pathology 
services to UBMC. (R. 185-86, 189, 546). 
4. Paragraph 11 of the Agreement provides: 
This agreement shall become effective August 1, 
1994 and continue to bind the parties to the terms 
hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days written 
notice for just cause of termination by either party or 
by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice 
period. 
(R. 185-86, 546). 
5. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Dr. Hardy agreed to (a) be 
available for physician consults to interpret laboratory results; (b) visit the 
UBMC hospital weekly for one to two hours to recommend processes and 
policies to assure smooth operation of the UBMC laboratory, and (c) 
undertake teaching activities when new procedures were introduced. (R. 
185-86). 
6. The Board is the entity authorized to terminate personal services 
contracts. (R. 546). 
7. Pursuant to the Bylaws, the Board can terminate membership on 
the medical staff: 
ufor any purpose reasonably related to the delivery 
of quality patient care services, including but not 
limited to: 
9 
(a) The Hospital's ability to provide services related 
to a medical specialty or sub-specialty; 
(b) The Hospital's patient load; 
(c) The determination that granting Medical Staff 
membership is inconsistent with the mission, role 
and purpose of the Hospital; 
(d) The Failure of the practitioner to comply with 
the terms of the Hospital or Medical Staff Bylaws, 
rules and regulations; 
(e) Any other reason specified in these or the 
Medical Staff Bylaws or others not specified which 
are reasonably related to the delivery of quality 
patient care. 
(R. 994). 
8. On July 18, 1996, the Board voted to terminate the Agreement and 
to invite Dr. Allred to join UBMC's medical staff as a pathologist and as an 
emergency room physician. (R. 290A, 290-91, 304, 545). 
9. Dr. Hardy continued working for UBMC until October 28, 1996, 
approximately 90 days after UBMC notified him it was terminating the 
Agreement. (R. 189, 545). 
10. Prior to his termination, Dr. Hardy performed his obligations 
under the Agreement satisfactorily and received no complaints whatsoever 
from UBMC or its medical staff. After termination of the Agreement, on a 
few occasions, at the request of members of the UBMC medical staff, and 
with the approval of the UBMC administration, Dr. Hardy performed 
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limited pathology services for members of the UBMC medical staff in Dr. 
Allred's absence. (R. 189, 545). 
11. Dr. Joseph J. Sannella was the pathologist who preceded Dr. 
Hardy and his contract had language identical to Dr. Hardy's stating that the 
contract would "continue to bind the parties to the terms [ ] until after 
ninety (90) days written notice for just cause of termination by either party 
or by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice period." (R. 1538). 
A true and correct copy of Dr. Sannella's contract is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit "F". 
12. Dr. Wayne T. Stewart was a radiologist at UBMC and his contract 
provided for termination only "(a) for the loss of a licence [sic] to practice 
in the State of Utah, or; (b) for the conviction of a felony, or; (c) by the 
mutual consent of both parties." (R. 1458). A true and correct copy of Dr. 
Stewart's contract is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "G". 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erred in not construing the facts available to it in the 
light most favorable to Dr. Hardy as the nonmoving party. Utah law is clear 
that "[a] trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary 
judgment motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact 
exists,..." Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, ^|24, 42 P.3d 
11 
379.5 Dr. Hardy presented ample evidence, even without developing the 
record as directed by the Supreme Court, to create a genuine issue of 
material fact upon which reasonable minds could differ. For instance, the 
very fact that UBMC entered into other contracts terminable for "just cause" 
is sufficient evidence that Dr. Hardy's was not the first such contract, and 
that there was a precedent for contracts with "just cause" termination 
clauses. The Trial Court completely ignored these contracts which evidence 
UBMC's history of entering into contracts terminable for cause, and made a 
factual determination as to the type of contracts "typically" entered into by 
UBMC. The trier of fact, a jury in this case, is the proper party to determine 
what weight is to be given the contracts proffered by Dr. Hardy, not the 
Trial Court at the summary judgment stage. 
The Trial Court exceeded its authority in granting UBMC's motion for 
summary judgment, completely disregarding the purpose of summary 
judgment. Utah law is clear that: 
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment 
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments 
of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. 
Nor is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve 
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate 
5
 See also Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995) 
where the Court stated that "[o]n a motion for summary judgment, a trial 
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be 
whether material issues of fact exist." Id. at 1100. 
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the time, trouble and expense of trial when upon any 
view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled 
against, he would not be entitled to prevail. Only 
when it so appears, is the court justified in refusing 
such a party the opportunity of presenting his 
evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to 
his views. Conversely, if there is any dispute as to 
any issue, material to the settlement of the 
controversy, the summary judgment should not be 
granted. 
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). Because the Trial 
Court made credibility determinations and ignored disputed issues of fact 
favoring Dr. Hardy, the Trial Court's granting of UBMC's post-remand 
motion for summary judgment should be reversed. 
The Trial Court erred in not allowing additional discovery to develop 
the record so the scope of the "just cause" provision in Dr. Hardy's contract 
could be fairly determined. The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case "to 
permit the district court to allow further development of the record ..." 
Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at ^[18. Further, the Court suggested that it might 
be "useful to compare Dr. Hardy's contract to the agreements UBMC 
typically enters into with medical professionals." Id. at f 18. The Trial 
Court did not allow development of the record and dismissed evidence of 
other contracts with similar termination provisions. In this case, the Trial 
Court assumed the role of fact-finder without allowing additional discovery 
as directed by the Supreme Court. 
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The Trial Court erred in not allowing the jury to determine the 
reasonableness of the duration of Dr. Hardy's contract. On summary 
judgment, Judge Anderson must look at the evidence before him and 
determine whether there is enough evidence to proceed to trial A 
determination about reasonableness that includes weighing the evidence, 
and the credibility assigned to that evidence, should not take place at the 
summary judgment stage, but is left for the jury to decide at trial. In Uintah 
Basin, the Utah Supreme Court used the term "trial court" liberally, but did 
not mean that the Court was to determine all of the issues. The Trial Court 
was to make only the initial determination of whether reasonable evidence 
existed to support Dr. Hardy's theory of the case. Historically, there are 
defined roles of judge and jury that need to be upheld. Questions of weight 
and credibility are jury questions, while questions of law are for the Court to 
decide. 
It is a well-settled contract law principle that the jury evaluates 
reasonableness of duration. See Green v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 
1192, 1202-03 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); see also Stutzke v. D.G.C. Liquidation 
Co., 533 So.2d 897, 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Burger ChefSyst. Inc. v. 
Burger Chef of Fla., Inc. 317 So.2d 795,798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
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There is currently no Utah case law addressing this aspect of a jury's duty, 
and, therefore, this Court should clarify Utah law on this issue. 
Finally, the Trial Court erred in not allowing the jury to determine 
whether or not UBMC had "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy. Clearly 
defined roles of judge and jury are important, especially in situations where 
there are mixed questions of law and fact. Dr. Hardy has a right to have the 
jury determine not only the reasonableness of the contract duration, but 
whether or not UBMC had just cause to terminate him. The Trial Court 
overstepped its bounds by making these and other determinations on 
summary judgment (even after ruling that the question of whether UBMC 
had just cause to terminate the Agreement was for the jury to decide as a 
question of fact). See R. 737 & 1055. This Court should more clearly 
delineate the roles of judge and jury, specifically in the area of contract 
interpretation and application. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSTRUING THE 
FACTS AVAILABLE TO IT IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO DR. HARDY AS THE NONMOVING PARTY. 
It is well-settled that on summary judgment, a judge is charged with 
reviewing the evidence presented, construing that evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, and determining whether reasonable 
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minds could differ as to the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom. 
Summary judgment is meant to "weed out" cases that are so devoid of 
evidence that no reasonable person could find in favor of the nonmoving 
party.7 In this instance, the Trial Court was asked to make a threshold 
determination of whether the just cause provision created an unreasonable 
time duration for Dr. Hardy's contract. Stated somewhat differently, the 
Trial Court was directed to analyze whether a reasonable person could 
interpret the pertinent facts in such a way that made the durational element 
of Dr. Hardy's Agreement (i.e., the occurrence of "just cause") appear 
reasonable. If there were sufficient facts that might lead a reasonable 
person to find the contract reasonable (at least with respect to the 
circumstances under which it could be terminated), then the Trial Court's 
See Mountain States Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 
Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). 
7
 See Crawford-el v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) where the Court 
stated that: 
summary judgment serves as the ultimate screen to 
weed out truly insubstantial lawsuits prior to trial. 
At that stage, if the defendant-official has made a 
properly supported motion, the plaintiff may not 
respond simply with general attacks upon the 
defendant's credibility, but rather must identify 
affirmative evidence from which a jury could find 
that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden of 
proving the pertinent motive. 
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job was done and it needed to deny the motion for summary judgment and 
give the case to the jury (i.e., the trier of fact). If there was no possible way 
that a reasonable person could interpret the durational element as 
reasonable, then the Trial Court was obligated to grant the summary 
judgment motion and take the case away from the jury. 
In making that threshold determination, the universal directive to the 
Trial Court is that the facts must (without exception) be construed in favor 
of the nonmoving party, i.e., Dr. Hardy. There is no weighing or assessing 
the facts - the facts as presented by the non-movant are accepted as true. In 
this case (albeit without the benefit of additional discovery), Dr. Hardy 
presented the Trial Court with two other contracts without specific time 
limits. That fact alone should have been sufficient to find the just cause 
provision reasonable. That is, UBMC had found that the practice of 
ensuring a doctor's contract would continue (except, for example, in the 
instance of professional malfeasance on the part of the doctor or an 
extraordinary change in the circumstances of the hospital) until just cause 
occurred was in the best interest of the hospital. The Utah Supreme Court 
asked the Trial Court to develop the record as to what those benefits might 
be (e.g., attraction and retention of specialist that might not otherwise 
practice in a rural hospital such as UBMC) and to explore the downside to 
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such contracts. The Utah Supreme Court asked the Trial Court to take 
evidence of any other factors that might bear on the reasonableness of the 
contract term, which might include a more detailed examination of what the 
Board of Trustees intended when they approved Dr. Hardy's contract, why 
Dr. Hardy's contract differed from the other contracts with time limits, why 
UBMC would continue with Dr. Stewart's contract (which is devoid of a 
specific time limit) when the hospital was arguing in this litigation that such 
a contract was unreasonable. In essence, the Utah Supreme Court asked the 
Trial Court to survey the entire evidentiary landscape upon which Dr. 
Hardy's Agreement would be assessed and decide whether a reasonable 
person could somehow interpret the facts as advanced by Dr. Hardy were 
reasonable in any plausible way. 
The Trial Court misinterpreted the instructions of the Utah Supreme 
Court and mistakenly thought that the appellate court was asking the Trial 
Court to do something more than just the threshold inquiry that is required 
in a summary judgment setting. The Trial Court did not ask whether the 
facts as presented by Dr. Hardy were reasonable, but rather jumped into the 
realm of assessing and judging those facts for itself. The most glaring 
example of the erroneous path taken by the Trial Court was its categorical 
rejection of the two other contracts without specific time limits - Drs. 
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Sannella and Stewart's contracts. The Trial Court should have looked at 
those contracts and determined that Dr. Hardy's Agreement was not 
aberrational. If it was reasonable for UBMC to honor Dr. Stewart's contract 
even while disputing the reasonableness of Dr. Hardy's contract, it is 
certainly reasonable to think that UBMC saw value in such contracts. 
The assessments made by the Trial Court were well beyond the scope 
of the assignment given the Trial Court in the context of a summary 
judgment. In order to survive summary judgment, Dr. Hardy "need only 
present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor. If he 
does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial." Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 257 (1986)(emphasis added).8 Finally, 
the United States Supreme Court has held that "the issue of fact must be 
'genuine." and that the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show 
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In 
this case, Dr. Hardy has presented more than enough genuine evidence, even 
The Court in Liberty Lobby also stated that u[t]he inquiry performed is the 
threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial— 
whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly 
can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be 
resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250. 
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without further development of the record, on which reasonable minds could 
differ as to the evidence and inferences drawn. 
A. The Trial Court Infringed on the Jury's Duty By Weighing 
the Evidence and Determining Reasonableness of Duration, 
On remand, the Trial Court was charged with developing the record in 
order that a jury could determine reasonableness. Instead, the Trial Court 
determined reasonableness from the evidence before it. While it was 
necessary for Judge Anderson to review the facts before him, it was for the 
limited purpose of determining whether there was enough evidence to go to 
trial, all the while viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Dr. Hardy, 
not for him to weigh the evidence at the summary judgment stage, and to 
make a determination of reasonableness.9 
It is clear from the Ruling that the Trial Court did not construe the 
facts available to it in the light most favorable to Dr. Hardy. Without even 
considering additional evidence, the Trial Court determined that the scope 
of the "just cause" provision is narrow and the duration is unreasonable. 
The Utah Supreme Court's references to the evidence before the Court 
without further development of the record in the Uintah Basin decision 
alone are sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact where 
9
 See Liberty Lobby, All U.S. at 255 where the Court held that "[credibility 
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge,..." 
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reasonable minds could differ. For instance, the Utah Supreme Court noted 
that UBMC's bylaws appear to be quite broad based on the power given to 
the Board of Trustees to terminate medical staff. See Uintah Basin, 2002 
UT 92 at | 18 , note 4. The Trial Court completely disregarded this and all 
other facts favoring Dr. Hardy, adopting wholeheartedly UBMC's recitation 
of the facts and inferences drawn therefrom. 
Dr. Hardy's pleadings are replete with facts proving that his contract 
with UBMC was reasonable in light of the circumstances of his practice and 
the rural nature of the hospital and community. At the very least, 
reasonable minds could differ on the interpretation of the facts regarding the 
reasonableness of the contract's duration and "just cause" issues, and, 
therefore, Judge Anderson's grant of summary judgment should be reversed. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not View Evidence of the Other 
Contracts in a Light Most Favorable to Dr. Hardy. 
The Trial Court erred when it made a determination that Dr. Hardy's 
contract was unreasonable when compared to contracts UBMC entered into 
with other physicians. The Court ignored Drs. Sannella and Stewart's 
contracts, neither of which includes a duration. See R. at 1460 & 1539. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court suggested that a review of other contracts 
would be useful in determining the scope of the "just cause" provision, the 
Trial Court infringed on the jury's role when it chose to ignore other factors. 
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Further, the Trial Court cannot make a determination as to the significance 
of Drs. Sannella's and Stewart's contracts vis a vis Dr. Hardy's contract. At 
this stage, the Court should simply have reviewed the contracts presented to 
it and construed those contracts in a light most favorable to Dr. Hardy to 
determine whether reasonable minds could differ on the interpretation and 
application of those contracts to Dr. Hardy's. Reasonable minds could 
easily differ on the interpretation and application of those contracts to Dr. 
Hardy's, and a jury could find in Dr. Hardy's favor that the duration of his 
contract was appropriate to meet the needs of UBMC. 
At least two, and maybe more, of UBMC's previous contracts contain 
provisions either identical or similar to Dr. Hardy's "just cause" provision, 
and do not specify a duration. The jury should determine whether these two 
contracts, and perhaps others not yet discovered, are sufficient evidence to 
prove that Dr. Hardy's contract is, in fact, reasonable. 
The Trial Court also ignored UBMC's bylaws which, as noted by the 
Utah Supreme Court, "suggest that UBMC routinely enters into agreements 
under which the only practical durational limit is a liberally-construed 'just 
cause' provision." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at ^fl8, note 4. Although it is 
not necessary to survive summary judgment, at the very least, Dr. Hardy 
should be allowed to conduct additional discovery in order to develop the 
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record on this issue, including a survey of all contracts that UBMC had with 
other doctors at the time Dr. Hardy's contract was entered into (i.e., 1994). 
II. DR. HARDY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONDUCT 
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY IN ORDER TO DEVELOP THE 
RECORD SO THAT THE SCOPE AND REASONABLENESS OF 
THE JUST CAUSE PROVISION CAN BE FAIRLY 
DETERMINED. 
UBMC has a history of contracting with physicians for jobs 
terminable for cause.10 Dr. Hardy has alleged this in previous pleadings, 
and the Utah Supreme Court recognized that UBMC's contract history is 
relevant in determining the scope of the "just cause" provision. In fact, the 
Utah Supreme Court went so far as to remand this matter to the Trial Court 
"to allow further development of the record." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at 
^[18. The Trial Court ignored this directive and did not allow the additional 
discovery requested by Dr. Hardy. 
Instead, the Trial Court summarily discarded the other contracts which 
prove that Dr. Hardy's was not the first to contain a "just cause" provision, 
questioned Dr. Hardy's understanding of the provision, and completely 
ignored the Supreme Court's determination that "[u]nder the bylaws, 'just 
cause' appears to have a broad scope:..." Id. at f 18, note 4. 
10
 Drs. Sannella and Stewart both had contracts with UBMC that were 
terminable for cause. 
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A. Summary Judgment is Not Appropriate When Discovery is 
Not Complete, 
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged in Drysdale v. Ford Motor 
Co., 947 P.2d 678 (Utah 1997) that '"[l]itigants must be able to present their 
cases fully to the court before judgment can be rendered against them unless 
it is obvious from the evidence before the court that the party opposing 
judgment can establish no right to recovery."5 Id. at 680 (citing Mountain 
States Tel, 681 P.2d at 1261). The Court went on to state that "[pjrior to 
the completion of discovery, however, it is often difficult to ascertain 
whether the nonmoving party will be able to sustain its claims. In such a 
case, summary judgment should generally be denied." Id. Even without 
additional discovery, Dr. Hardy has offered sufficient evidence to survive 
summary judgment, creating a genuine issue of material fact on which 
reasonable minds could differ. 
However, additional discovery is necessary in this case to determine 
whether UBMC contracted with any other physicians who were terminable 
for cause. Dr. Hardy is vitally interested in finding out why UBMC entered 
into contracts similar to his, without durations, with Drs. Sannella and 
Stewart. To this end, Dr. Hardy has a right to depose Dr. Stewart regarding 
his contract. UBMC argued on summary judgment that further discovery 
was not needed despite specifically refusing to allow Dr. Stewart to testify 
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as to the terms of his contract with UBMC—a contract that permits 
termination only under two very restrictive circumstances. See Exhibit G to 
Dr. Hardy's Opposition to Plaintiffs Post Remand Motion for Summary 
Judgment where Dr. Hardy's counsel asks about the terms of Dr. Stewart's 
contract with UBMC and UBMC's counsel instructs him not to answer. (R. 
1500). Regarding Dr. Stewart's contract, why did UBMC continue to honor 
a contract devoid of a durational limit, like Dr. Stewart's, when the hospital 
was arguing in this litigation that such a contract was unreasonable? These 
are all questions that need to be answered before reasonableness can be 
determined. 
Further, UBMC refused in the past to provide other UBMC contracts 
which were requested by Dr. Hardy. Although it provided some of these 
contracts with its summary judgment pleadings, Dr. Hardy is not confident 
that UBMC has provided all contracts. In addition, UBMC states that it has 
"negotiated a few contracts, primarily in the 1980's, that had indefinite 
durations to entice doctors to work at UBMC." (R. 1415). UBMC has not 
produced those contracts to Dr. Hardy and they are relevant in determining 
the types of contracts UBMC "typically enters into with medical 
professionals." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at ^fl8. This admission confirms 
that UBMC did, in fact, typically enter into contracts with indefinite 
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durations when circumstances called for it. It makes no difference when 
UBMC entered those contracts, only that it did. Surely a jury could find 
this evidence compelling in determining the reasonableness of Dr. Hardy's 
contract. 
Dr. Hardy should be allowed to find out why some of UBMC s 
contracts contain durational limits, while others, like his, are terminable 
only for cause. What is the distinction? Dr. Hardy believes that the answer 
to this question is simple. The contracts that have durational limits cover 
patient-based doctors, or doctors who develop a practice independent of a 
hospital. Dr. Hardy is a hospital-based physician who relies on other 
doctors for his practice. Dr. Hardy (like Dr. Stewart who is a radiologist) 
does not have private patients. Rather, Dr. Hardy's pathology practice is a 
medical service made available to other doctors who may have patients at 
the hospital. The Trial Court disregarded this argument altogether. 
Additionally, how do the durational contracts work? Do they automatically 
renew every few years? If so, how is this different from Dr. Hardy's 
contract? Realistically, the durational contracts, if they automatically 
renew, are terminable for cause, meaning they are based on that physician's 
professional competence. 
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In addition, Dr. Hardy may wish to hire an additional expert, or 
qualify an existing expert on the issue of standard contract provisions 
utilized by rural hospitals when trying to attract hospital-based doctors such 
as pathologists or radiologists. What is the "industry practice" of rural 
hospitals in contracting with hospital-based physicians? UBMC admits that 
it uses the indefinite contract terminable only for cause when it has trouble 
attracting doctors, and the approach taken by other hospitals surely will 
assist the jury with the determination of the reasonableness of the "just 
cause" provision in Dr. Hardy's contract. (R. 1415). In essence, the Utah 
Supreme Court asked the Trial Court to survey the entire landscape upon 
which Dr. Hardy's Agreement would be assessed and decide whether a 
reasonable person could somehow interpret the facts as advanced by Dr. 
Hardy were reasonable in any plausible way. Without additional discovery, 
a fair determination about the reasonableness of Dr. Hardy's Agreement 
cannot possibly be made. 
B. The Scope of the "Just Cause" Provision Relates to UBMC's 
Understanding of its Own Rights and Powers to Terminate a 
Physician, Not Dr. Hardy's Understanding of the Term. 
Both the Trial Court and UBMC make much of Dr. Hardy's 
declaration which details his understanding of the meaning of "just cause." 
UBMC was successful in convincing the Trial Court that Dr. Hardy's 
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understanding of "just cause" is relevant to determining the scope of the 
"just cause" provision. However, Dr. Hardy's understanding of the meaning 
of the term "just cause" is secondary. The Utah Supreme Court stated that 
the scope of the "just cause" provision "depends in large part on the amount 
of discretion [the] provision gives to successor boards." Uintah Basin, 2002 
UT 92 at 1}18. The Utah Supreme Court noted that under UBMC's bylaws, 
"'just cause' appears to have a broad scope: for instance, the board may 
terminate a member of the medical staff for any reason 'reasonably related 
to the delivery of quality patient care.'" Id. at ^[18, note 4. The Trial Court 
misapplied Uintah Basin and stated that "[g]iven Dr. Hardy's understanding 
of the intended scope of the just cause clause in light of the Utah Supreme 
Court's opinion, the contract offered little discretion to successor boards." 
(R. 1625). The Utah Supreme Court did not determine that the "just cause" 
provision in Dr. Hardy's contract is narrow. In fact, the Court held just the 
opposite as noted above. Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at f 18, note 4. It is 
clear that it makes no difference what Dr. Hardy understands "just cause" to 
mean. The scope of the clause applies to UBMC's power and/or 
understanding of its power. What is important, is the UBMC Board of 
Trustees' intent in contracting with Dr. Hardy as to those circumstances 
under which UBMC might terminate Dr. Hardy's Agreement. The focus 
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should be on UBMC, not on what Dr. Hardy thought were the instances 
where he could be terminated. 
Even if the scope revolved around Dr. Hardy's understanding, this 
Court should find that the Trial Court erred in making credibility 
determinations at the summary judgment stage. Dr. Hardy's declaration was 
submitted simply to expand on his understanding of the meaning of "just 
cause," and it in no way contradicts his deposition testimony.11 The Trial 
Court continued down its errant path by passing judgment on the declaration 
submitted by Dr. Hardy. Rather than seeing the declaration for what it was 
(i.e., an exposition of the circumstances where Dr. Hardy's contract might 
be terminated for reasons other than those arising from Dr. Hardy's 
performance), the Trial Court dismissed it as self-serving. In light of the 
Utah Supreme Court's directive to outline the instances where the contract 
might be terminated, Dr. Hardy addressed those instances where his 
profession (pathology) or the circumstances of the hospital (e.g., closure of 
the hospital for myriad reasons) might radically change, thereby permitting 
a termination of the contract. In no way did Dr. Hardy contradict what he 
said at his deposition; rather he addressed a question that was not asked of 
him at his deposition: are there circumstances, other than Dr. Hardy's 
11
 See relevant portions of Dr. Hardy's deposition at R. 1389-93, a true and 
correct copy of which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "H". 
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professicr ] * TTRMf 
Hardy's contract? The answer was and still is yes. For unforeseen reasons, 
UBMC might be forced to close down (e.g., financial reasons, inability ol 
doctors to obtain malpractice insurance, declining population in the Uintah 
Basin, etc,), 'I lie questioi i, of wl letl lei the hospital might have a legal 
J 1 ' - • . . . 
dep* 
needed to answer that question, which he did in his declaration. 
Irrespective of those cataclysmic or professional reasons that might 
allow UBMC to walk aw ay from. Dr. Hardy's Agreement (closure of the 
hospital, elimination *•; his specialty; , Hardy's position on termination 
:••:**•• d i leed of pathology 
s<* r ' i i v s ;111< 1 | mi 11\ a 
professionally competent manner, theii UBMC was obligated (J 
with the arrangement it had with Dr. Hardy. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated its position on the issue of 
1 >os1 depositioi I statements in W ebslei v. S il /, 6 ; 5 P 2c I 11 ; 0 (1 Jtah 1/983 ) 
v a 
deposition, that is not modified on , i< ,s-rxiiiiiiii,ilioii lm HUM, I ml ihmNilh r 
raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his 
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deposition..." Id. at 1172-73 (emphasis added). Dr. Hardy was asked 
during his deposition what he thought ujust cause" meant. He gave an 
honest answer. Dr. Hardy's declaration is simply an expansion of his 
deposition answer, not a contradiction as required in Webster. 
The Trial Court also erred when it determined that Dr. Hardy's 
declaration could not be relied upon. It is not proper at the summary 
judgment stage for the Trial Court to assess the credibility or reliability of 
Dr. Hardy's declaration as compared to his deposition testimony. See 
Trujillo, 986 P.2d at f42 (the question of credibility should not be 
determined on summary judgment). 
III. WHETHER OR NOT DR. HARDY'S CONTRACT DURATION IS 
REASONABLE IS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY. 
In Uintah Basin, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[w]hether a 
contract's duration is 'reasonable' depends on the circumstances of each 
case." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at 1{17.13 The Trial Court must determine 
whether there is enough evidence for a jury to find in Dr. Hardy's favor 
regarding reasonableness of duration, but once the Court makes that 
determination, fact issues, like whether the duration of the contract is 
12
 See also Mountain States, 681 P.2d at 1261. 
13
 Whether the use of the term "district court" in the opinion was a result of 
carelessness, ease of reference, or the status of the case on appeal, it 
certainly does not mean that the Judge is to decide every issue. 
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contract with Dr. Hardy, predominate and are left for the j m addition, 
if extrinsic evidence is necessary to determine the intent of the parties, then 
the determination should be reserved for the jtii) ' There is ample evidence 
in this case on which reasonable minds could differ, and the jury should be 
reasom < j - »t i. 
i I . Extrinsic Evidence is Admissible in. this Case to Determine 
Reasonableness, 
There is relevant extrinsic c\ ideuce in this case that should be 
provided to tl le trier of feet Black 's I aw Dictionary defines "extrinsic 
a contract bi it not appearing on tl le f ace 
o f t h e c o 1:111 a c t b e c a i i s e i t : • :) i i I e s f i o i i I 311 I e i s o i 11 • ::: e s, s i i c I: I a s s t a t e i i I e i 11 s 
between the parties or the circumstances sumuindin|.' ihr ^ . rnTnc '" 
B L A C K ' S L A W DICTIONARY 578 (7th ed. 1999). The Supreme Court noted 
the importance of UBMC's past ccmtractual practices with its physicians. 
'I 1 lis evidence is extrinsic as it does not appear on the face of the contract. 
1
 * See Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) where 
Court stated that " [genera l ly , when contract interpretation will be 
determined by extrinsic evidence of intent, it becomes a question of fact." 
Id. at 871. The Court went on to hold that "if [the]'extrinsic evidence is 
disputed, then a material fact is also disputed, and summary judgment 
cannot be granted." T ' 
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This and other evidence relevant to the reasonableness determination is 
necessary for a fair interpretation of Dr. Hardy's contract. Extrinsic 
evidence is used to prove intent as set forth in Ward v. Intermountain 
Farmers Assoc, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995) where the Court stated that 
"'[Rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all 
credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties... '" Id. at 268 
(citation omitted). Further, extrinsic evidence is admissible "if the meaning 
of the contract is ambiguous or uncertain." Id. The Utah Supreme Court 
has directed that the reasonableness of the duration of Dr. Hardy's contract 
be determined. Inasmuch as it is proper to use extrinsic evidence to do so, 
the jury must make this determination. 
B. Reasonableness of Duration is a Question of Fact for the 
Jury to Determine. 
Even if extrinsic evidence is not admissible, it is a well-settled 
contract law principle that the jury evaluates reasonableness of duration. In 
Stutzke v. D.G.C. Liquidation Co., 533 So.2d 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), 
the Florida Court of Appeals held that "determination of what is a 
reasonable time is for the jury to make." Id. at 899; see also Burger Chef 
Syst., Inc. v. Burger Chef of Fla., Inc., 317 So.2d 795, 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1975)(holding that a jury evaluates what is a reasonable time for 
contract duration). In Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192 (Pa. 
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Super Ct 198 7) tl: le Coi n t carefi ill;} ana 1 v/nl t 
law and its treatment of lifetime contracts. In that case, the employee 
claimed that he entered into a lifetime contract h\ exchange for accepting 
pay at a rate below union scale. The Trial Court found that the employee 
worked al a lower pay in exchange f oi a promise that he would tiol Ua Liul 
of] nil! MI i"\< liaiiL'C toi -I lull linn ' onli.it I I In ,I|I|M.' Il.ilr \ uiuil iliSiiyuvd 
w i t h t h i » n 1 1 1 1 1 j«, . i i in 11 II11 II i II I II in mi I " 1 1 1 I I in i in I , u • 1 1 1 . 1 1 i ' i n < \ I  i m < 11 in m i n •« I I » i • " i m l b » 1 1 m IIII i • t II 
to a jury." Id. at 1202. The Court went on to state that u[t]he court must 
allow the jury to consider the circumstances surrounding the agreement." 
Id. 
1 , ;:.a. .. determination nFreasonableness could even 
re ni f ac ts 
are undispute 
AMFAC, Inc. *. ;; ui.%i*i Beachcomber Inv. c^., coV I\2u 10, 24 (Haw. 
1992). The evidence in this case is not clear or decisive, At a minimum, 
reasonable minds could diik r n^  tn whether the contract duration set forth in 
First, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that an indeflnit 
not necessarily result in aii unreasonable contract. Uintah Basin, 2002 UI 
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92 at f 17. Second, UBMC drafted the contract provision at issue. During 
negotiations to attract Dr. Hardy to the hospital, UBMC used its existing 
contract with its previous pathologist, Dr. Sannella, as the template for its 
contract offer to Dr. Hardy. While this contract may or may not have been 
unusual when compared to other fields of specialty, UBMC clearly had a 
precedent for this type of arrangement with its pathologist. 
In addition, UBMC admits that a similar indefinite contract terminable 
for cause was entered into with Dr. Stewart who is a radiologist. This is 
important to the reasonableness determination because both pathologists and 
radiologists are hospital-based practitioners. In other words, they are 
unique because they rely on other doctors for their practice—they do not 
bring in their own patients. So, while patient-based doctors may have been 
negotiating contracts with terms for one year to five years, the doctors who 
have hospital-based practices are different. 
UBMC also admits that in addition to utilizing "just cause" contracts 
to attract hospital-based doctors, it has utilized "just cause" contracts for 
other physicians when it was difficult to attract physicians to its hospital 
with limited terms. (R. 1415). That is the function of the open market 
facing UBMC when it contracts under its proprietary function. Negotiations 
and market forces require different results in different conditions, and at 
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different times. UBMC should not be allowed to change the terms of that 
negotiation now that sonic time has passed and it thinks it can get a better 
deal.15 
Throughout the histor> < <• . igation, I IBI\ 1C has emphasized the 
'language (llliihi! illllli niilun I, i . dial'lnl .ind s)|»iiu, ill In llu |i.n Mrs, 'nun U MM 
nocd^'of Uintah Basin M '^dii'itl frntiM ,it tlii>; iiii n * 11«' I nil I i I In linn ill 
contracting is the only time period that matters, and a jury should decide, 
based on the facts, whether the duration of Dr. Hard) \ contract was 
reasonable when made,16 Inasmuch as there is currently i 10 Utah case la;v\ 
addressing this aspect oi a jury's duly, and, because contract interpretation 
whether re is, • , r]- -, 
judge, ^x. xx^U; oelieves that the law u vi^cii, tmo i^  a question of fact 
reserved for the jury. 
15
 See Salt Lake City v. State, 448 P.2d 350, 354 (Utah 1968)(noting that "a 
city has no more right to repudiate its contracts than has a private person," 
and rebuking the city because, having gained the benefit of the bargain 
made, it "hopes to find a loophole by which it can escape from its duty" 
under the same contract); Bair v. Layton City Corp., 307 P.2d 895, 902-03 
(Utah 1957)(noting that the measurement for reasonableness is not after 
time has passed, but determined at the time the contract was entered into, 
and if the necessities of the situation at that time called for such a contract, 
then it is reasonable). 
See generally Consolidated Wagon & Mach. Lu. v. Wright, 190 P. 937, 
939 (Utah 1920). 
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IV. THERE IS A GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO WHETHER UBMC 
HAD JUST CAUSE TO TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT AND 
THIS QUESTION MUST BE RESERVED FOR THE JURY. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that uDr. Hardy's indefinite-length 
contract is terminable for 'just cause'" Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at ^22. 
The Trial Court has already ruled that the jury should decide whether 
UBMC had "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy. (R. 737 & 1055). At an 
absolute minimum, the evidence uncovered thus far demonstrates that there 
is a genuine factual dispute over whether UBMC had legitimate business 
reasons for terminating Dr. Hardy and hiring Dr. Allred, or whether 
UBMC's alleged business reasons are an after-the-fact attempt to fabricate 
"just cause." Some of the evidence creating a genuine issue of fact 
includes: 
• Testimony from Dr. Wayne Stewart, a member of the UBMC 
Board of Trustees, that he never discussed with anyone at 
UBMC the hospital's need for an on-site pathologist until Dr. 
Allred began inquiring about the pathology position at UBMC. 
(R. 603-05). 
• Testimony from Dr. Elizabeth Hammond, Dr. Hardy's expert on 
pathology and hospital hiring procedures for pathologists, that 
UBMC did not adequately investigate Dr. Allred's credentials 
before hiring him. (R. 599-602). 
• Minutes from the UBMC Board of Trustees which do not reflect 
any discussion of a need at UBMC for an on-site pathologist. 
(R. 583-92). 
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• ruiy Hussey's testimony thai umviL, conducted no invesuj. ;i. 
of the financial impact of hiring Dr. Allred, (R. 596-98) 
Brad LeBaron s testimony that UBMC never contacted a single 
pathologist who _\ _r worked with Dr. Allred. (R. 594-95). 
• There is no t - Menu: 11 • at I JBMC conducted any economic 
analysis or legitimate inquiry as to the financial or economic 
advantages of hiring Dr. Allred. Nor did UBMC list air 
business reasons when it decided to terminate Dr. Hardy. (R. 
1471, 1474 * M90). 
lirad LeBaron's testimony that UBMC had substantial and 
reoccurring problems with Dr. Allred's turn around time, and 
that there were patient complaints from the emergency room 
about Dr. Allred. (R. 1531). 
* Dr. Allred is no longer working at LiiMC and has left the State 
of Utah. 
There are ;H^ HUT , < mpelling facts which suggest that UBMC did not 
have "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy, including, most importantly, the 
fact tl lat tl lere * ei e never any complaints made against Di I lai d> during 1 lis 
ei i lplo} i nei it. 
Dr. Hardy has a right to have a ji ir> weigh the facts set f oi th at: o • / e, 
and others, to determine whether UBMC had "just cause" to terminate his 
employment. Reasonable minds could differ as to this determination and, 
therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court abdicated its duty in the summary judgment 
proceedings by not construing the evidence presented to it in the light most 
favorable to Dr. Hardy as the non-moving party. Dr. Hardy has presented 
more than enough evidence, even without developing the record as directed 
by the Utah Supreme Court, on which reasonable minds can differ and find 
in his favor. Further, the Court infringed on the jury's role in this matter 
which is to determine whether the duration of Dr. Hardy's contract is 
reasonable and whether UBMC had "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy. 
The Utah Supreme Court remanded this case to the Trial Court so that the 
Trial Court could determine the scope of the "just cause" provision and that 
is all. The Utah Supreme Court even went so far as to suggest how the Trial 
Court could go about making this decision, and clearly set forth its own 
interpretation of UBMC s bylaws which suggest that the scope of the "just 
cause" provision is broad. 
Although contract interpretation is a mixed question of law and fact, 
there is compelling case law in other states holding that reasonableness of 
duration is a question of fact for the jury to decide. This makes sense 
because a jury should weigh the factors that went into the decision to make 
Dr. Hardy's contract terminable only for "just cause." The Trial Court, in 
39 
overstepping its duU ompletely disregarded the evidence presented to ii 
regarding why UBMC and Dr. Hardy contracted as they did. Inasmuch as 
Utah law has not squarely addressed this issue, this Court should determine 
whethei the jury is, in lael, entitled to determine reasonableness of duration. 
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previously and nothing has changed in this case to reverse that decision. 
The facts in this case show that there is a genuine issue of material fact c*i. 
which reasonable minds could differ. Accordingly, this Court should enter 
an order reversing the I i ial Court' s ruling granting summary judgment in 
liivr 11 I IIIMT. 
D A T l ' l ) I £ $ ' (1n\ ill M I I K I I , .''(104. 
Holland & Hart LLP 
John P. Harrington 
Jennifer L. Lange 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Leo W. Hardy, M O. 
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Tab A 
Duct.e'stte county Hospital 
November ?9, 
Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
P.O. Box 795 
Price, UT 84501 
Dear Dr. Hardy: 
We appreciate your response to our request to have a formal agreement in handling oui 
Pathology needs. Listed below is the proposal submitted by you. I have reviewed this with 
Joe Hokett and have found that it meets the needs of Uintah Basin Medical Center at this 
time. Our agreement, therefore, includes the following 
1. Dr, Hardy agrees to personally visit the Uintah Basm Medical Center Laboratory 
weekly or will have another pathologist visit the hospital if he is unavailable. 
2. Visits will not be substituted with technologists. Duration of visit will be for one to 
two hours devoted lo the following activities 
a. CAP proficiency survey reviews. 
b. Review of Uintah Basin Medical Center QC program. 
c. Recommending process to investigate technical and administrative |nul I in 
and advise adoption of policies and/or procedures foe correction. 
d. Develop liaison with all full-time Medical Staff members to enabk lull 
understanding of laboratory's role in supporting Medical Staffs mission. Will 
attend Medical Staff meetings quarterly. This meeting will be considered chat 
week's laboratory visit 
J Will be available to rhe Medical Staff tor help with interpretation of laboratory 
results. This would be a physician-to-physician consult. 
Will be available for more complex consultations, bone marrow biopsies, or tine 
needle aspiration biopsy of superficial masses (i.e., breast, thyroid, lymph node). 
Procedures in these categories will be direct patient services and will be billed as 
such. 
J . Will undertake teaching activities ioi Iiuil Mniirjl Mill mH I <h< i ilm v Si ill HI,„-, 
new procedures sue to be introduced 
Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
November 29, 1994 
Page 2 of 2 
6. Every opportunity to educate Laboratory Staff in those areas where new 
information or the need for better understanding of the need for clinical consultation 
will be pursued. 
7. Will take responsibility for continued CLIA accreditation, including interim self-
inspection, review of manuals, and all activities CLIA has identified as Laboratory 
Director responsibilities. 
8. Uintah Basin Medical Center is permitted to formally register me with the State of 
Utah and CAP as Laboratory Director, and inclusion of my name on any and all 
laboratory reports, thus documenting my medicolegal relationship with the Uintah 
Basin Medical Center Laboratory. 
9. Uintah Basin Medical Center will pay a Laboratory Director's fee of $400.00 per 
month, 
10. All surgical pathology and extra-genital cytology is referred to the Laboratory 
Director's practice, additional activities such as Medical Staff committee work will be 
undertaken. These may include Infection Control, Tissue Reviews, Surgical Case 
Review, Blood Utilization Review, and involvement in hospital-wide Continuing 
Quality Improvement. 
11. This agreement shall become effective August 1, 1994 and continue to bind the parties 
to the terms hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days written notice for just cause 
of termination by either party or by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice 
period. 
Your signature below indicates your acceptance of the responsibilities, services and benefits 
listed below. 
Sincerely, 
Bradley D.XeBaron, CHE 
Administrator 
LeoW 
TabB 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Leo W. HARDY, M.D., Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20000501. 
Aug. 30, 2002. 
Doctor brought action against county hospital after 
hospital's board of trustees voided contract under 
which doctor was to provide pathological services 
to hospital. The District Court, Eighth District, 
Duchesne County, John R. Anderson, J., granted 
hospital's motion for summary judgment. Doctor 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durrant, Associate 
C.J., held that: (1) contract involved a proprietary 
function and therefore was enforceable against 
successor boards of trustees if of a reasonable 
duration; (2) issue of whether contract was of a 
reasonable duration required remand; and (3) term 
of length could not be read into contract. 
Remanded with instructions. 
Russon, J., concurred in part and dissented in part 
with opinion in which Howe, J., concurred. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error €==>863 
30k863 Most Cited Cases 
In deciding whether the trial court correctly granted 
summary judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme 
Court gives no deference to the trial court's view of 
the law; it is reviewed for correctness. 
[2] Municipal Corporations €=>232 
268k232 Most Cited Cases 
Government contracts that extend beyond the term 
of the governing body that originally entered into 
the contract represent a public policy concern, as 
such contracts, if enforced, potentially allow a 
former governing body to perpetuate its policies 
beyond its term and thereby limit a successor 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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governing body's ability to respond to the public's 
changing needs. 
[3] Municipal Corporations €=^232 
268k232 Most Cited Cases 
Under the governmental/proprietary test to 
determine whether a government contract should be 
enforced against a successor governing body, a 
contract is (1) unenforceable against successor 
governing bodies if it involves a governmental 
power or function, but (2) enforceable against 
successor governing bodies if it involves a 
proprietary power or function and is of a reasonable 
duration. 
[4] Municipal Corporations €==>232 
268k232 Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court declined to repudiate the 
governmental/proprietary test, used to determine 
whether a government contract should be enforced 
against a successor government body. 
[5] Counties €=^114 
104kl 14 Most Cited Cases 
Contract for pathology services between doctor and 
county hospital involved a proprietary function and 
therefore was enforceable against successor boards 
of trustees if it was of a reasonable duration; 
services provided were not indispensable to the 
proper functioning of government, and doctor 
merely recommended policies related to hospital's 
pathology laboratory, while the board of trustees 
retained ultimate decision making authority. 
[6] Appeal and Error €=^172(1) 
30kl72(l) Most Cited Cases 
Doctor failed to raise argument in trial court that the 
county hospital's successor board of trustees was 
precluded from terminating his personal services 
contract with hospital because the board earlier 
ratified it, and thus Supreme Court declined to hear 
argument on appeal. 
[7] Appeal and Error €==>1178(1) 
30kl 178(1) Most Cited Cases 
Issue of whether contract between doctor and 
county hospital for doctor to provide pathological 
»Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
54P.3d 1165 
19 IER Cases 9,455 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 2002 UT 92 
(Cite as: 54 P.3d 1165) 
services was of a reasonable duration at the time 
they entered into the contract, and thus whether 
contract was an enforceable proprietary contract 
under the governmental/proprietary test, required 
remand. 
[8] Municipal Corporations €=>232 
268k232 Most Cited Cases 
Whether a contract's duration is reasonable for 
purposes of governmental/proprietary test to 
determine whether a government contract is binding 
on successor governing bodies depends on the 
circumstances of each case. 
[9] Municipal Corporations €=^ >232 
268k232 Most Cited Cases 
Depending on the circumstances, a lengthy or 
indefinite contractual duration is not necessarily an 
unreasonable duration under the 
governmental/proprietary test for a public contract 
to exist. 
[10] Counties €=^126 
104k 126 Most Cited Cases 
Term of length could not be read into personal 
services contract between doctor and county 
hospital; contract did not specify a duration, 
contract provided for termination for "just cause," 
parties agreed in their appellate briefs that the 
contract was of indefinite length, and term was not 
necessary to determine prospective damages for 
breach of the contract. 
[11] Contracts €^9(3) 
95k9(3) Most Cited Cases 
Parties have the right to enter into indefinite length 
contracts terminable for cause. 
[12] Master and Servant €=^7 
255k7 Most Cited Cases 
[12] Reformation of Instruments €=>16 
328k 16 Most Cited Cases 
When a contract for employment or personal 
services does not recite a fixed term, the law does 
not call for the judicial reformation of the contract 
to impose a term, especially when neither party 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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disputes the contract was of indefinite duration. 
*1166 Blaine J. Bernard, Eric G. Maxfield, 
Christine T. Greenwood, E. Blaine Rawson, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff. 
John P. Harrington, Joni J. Jones, Melissa H. Bailey 
, Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
INTRODUCTION 
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: 
f 1 This appeal concerns the voidability of certain 
government contracts. Specifically, we consider 
the question of when a contract entered into by a 
predecessor governing body is voidable by a 
successor governing body. Throughout the 
country, substantial case law has developed to 
distinguish between those government contracts that 
may be voided and those that may not be voided by 
a successor governing body. Various common law 
tests have been articulated, all designed to balance 
the tension between the right of a successor 
governing body to implement its own policies and 
not be bound by those of a former body, and the 
interest in providing some certainty to parties who 
contract with governing bodies. Utah courts have 
relied on the governmental/proprietary test, a test 
under which contracts involving proprietary 
functions and having reasonable durations are 
enforceable against successor governing bodies. 
t 2 In this case, the district court granted summary 
judgment to a county hospital on the theory that the 
particular contract at issue, a contract for the 
provision of pathological services to the hospital by 
a doctor, was voidable by the hospital's governing 
body—its board of trustees. The district court held 
that the contract had been entered into by a 
predecessor board and thus was voidable by 
successor boards. 
% 3 Because we conclude that the contract for 
pathological services involves a proprietary 
function, we remand with instructions that the 
district court determine whether the contract's 
duration was reasonable. 
BACKGROUND 
f 4 The following facts are undisputed. On 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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November 29, 1994, Dr. Leo Hardy entered into a 
contract with Uintah Basin Medical *1167 Center 
("UBMC"), a hospital owned by Duchesne County 
and operated by a board of trustees. Under the 
terms of the contract, Dr. Hardy received $400 per 
month for providing UBMC pathological services 
on a part-time basis and serving as the director of its 
pathology laboratory. The contract did not recite a 
termination date, but provided that either party 
could terminate the contract for "just cause" 
following ninety days' notice. 
f 5 Although Dr. Hardy performed his contractual 
obligations satisfactorily and received no 
complaints from UBMC or its medical staff, on July 
18, 1996, the UBMC board of trustees voted to give 
Dr. Hardy ninety days' notice and invite another 
doctor to join its medical staff as a pathologist and 
emergency room physician. When Dr. Hardy's 
termination became effective, UBMC sought a 
declaratory judgment that it had "just cause" to 
terminate the contract. Dr. Hardy counterclaimed, 
contending that UBMC materially breached the 
contract by terminating him because UBMC did not 
have "just cause." The district court initially 
denied the parties' respective motions for summary 
judgment, ruling that the jury would decide whether 
UBMC had "just cause". 
If 6 Following this ruling, the district court 
accepted supplemental briefing from the parties on 
an issue UBMC had raised for the first time in its 
answer to Dr. Hardy's counterclaim: whether the 
contract violated common law rules against 
government contracts that bind successor governing 
bodies. After hearing from the parties, the court 
granted UBMC summary judgment on the ground 
that the contract was voidable even without " 'just 
cause' simply because it could not bind successor 
Boards." In reaching this conclusion, the district 
court explained, "Due to the rapid advance of 
science, medicine [sic] changes and needs of 
patients there should be no reason for such an 
agreement to continue into the future or be binding 
on successor [b]oards where the governing [b]oard 
is a governmental entity." Dr. Hardy appeals. 
Section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code gives us 
appellate jurisdiction over this case. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp.2001). 
ANALYSIS 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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[1] | 7 "In deciding whether the trial court 
correctly granted [summary] judgment as a matter 
of law, 'we give no deference to the trial court's 
view of the law; we review it for correctness.' " 
SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback 
& Assocs., 2001 UT 54, \ 9, 28 P.3d 669 (quoting 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989)). 
II. RATIONALE BEHIND COMMON LAW 
RESTRICTIONS ON GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTS THAT BIND 
SUCCESSOR GOVERNING BODIES 
f 8 Before addressing Dr. Hardy's specific claims 
on appeal, we briefly discuss the rationale behind 
the common law rules regarding contracts that bind 
successor governing bodies. 
[2] f 9 Government contracts raise public policy 
concerns beyond those involved with private 
contracts. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Chester Hous. 
Auth, 389 Pa. 314, 132 A.2d 873, 876 (1957). 
One such concern involves contracts that extend 
beyond the term of the governing body that 
originally entered into the contract. Such contracts, 
if enforced, potentially allow a former governing 
body to perpetuate its policies beyond its term and 
thereby limit a successor governing body's ability to 
respond to the public's changing needs. See 
generally Figuly v. City of Douglas, 853 F.Supp. 
381,384(D.Wyo.l994). 
f 10 While such concerns militate against 
enforcing a predecessor governing body's contracts 
against its successors, the common law also 
recognizes a countervailing concern: that 
permitting successor governing bodies to 
indiscriminately terminate government contracts 
may make private parties hesitant to contract with 
government entities, thereby reducing the viability 
of contracts as a means of solving public problems. 
See Plant Food Co. v. City of Charlotte, 214 N.C. 
518, 199 S.E. 712,714(1938). 
[3][4] 1 11 A desire to accommodate these 
competing concerns animates the various common 
law tests for determining whether a *1168 contract 
should be enforced against a successor governing 
body. The test on which Utah courts rely is known 
as the governmental/proprietary test. See Bair v. 
Layton City Corp, 6 Utah 2d 138, 147-48, 307 
. Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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P.2d 895, 902 (1957); see also Salt Lake City v. 
State, 22 Utah 2d 37, 42, 448 P.2d 350, 354 (1968) 
(holding that contract for providing water to state 
capitol grounds was enforceable under the 
governmental/proprietary test). [FN1] Under the 
governmental/proprietary test, a contract is (1) 
unenforceable against successor governing bodies if 
it involves a governmental power or function, but 
(2) enforceable against successor governing bodies 
if it involves a proprietary power or function and is 
of a reasonable duration. Bair, 6 Utah 2d at 
147-48, 307 P.2d at 902. 
FN1. Citing various criticisms of the 
governmental/proprietary test, both parties 
urge us to repudiate it in favor of other 
common law tests. However, because the 
parties have failed to show that any of their 
suggested tests is clearly better than the 
governmental/proprietary test, we decline 
to repudiate it at this time. See State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) 
(noting that because of stare decisis, 
"[t]hose asking us to overturn prior 
precedent have a substantial burden of 
persuasion"). 
f 12 Having set forth the 
governmental/proprietary test, we next apply it to 
Dr. Hardy's contract to determine whether the 
contract may be validly enforced against successor 
hospital boards of trustees. 
III. WHETHER DR. HARDY'S CONTRACT IS 
ENFORCEABLE AGAINST SUCCESSOR 
BOARDS OF 
TRUSTEES 
[5][6] % 1 3 Dr. Hardy maintains the district court 
erred in concluding that his contract was voidable 
because it bound successor boards. [FN2] Relying 
on the governmental/proprietary test, Dr. Hardy 
argues that his contract for pathological services 
involves a proprietary function and therefore was 
enforceable against successor boards provided it is 
of a reasonable duration. We agree. 
FN2. Dr. Hardy also argues that the 
rationale behind the common law rules 
Page 4 
does not apply (1) to appointed, staggered 
boards like the UBMC board of trustees, 
or (2) until a majority of the nine voting 
members of the board are replaced. These 
arguments are without merit. First, the 
rationale behind the common law rules 
applies to appointed, staggered governing 
bodies because preexisting contracts may 
also unduly inhibit these bodies in the 
performance of their public duties. See 
Mitchell, 132 A.2d at 877-78; Piedmont 
Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Cowart, 319 S.C. 124, 
459 S.E.2d 876, 882 (App.1995). 
Second, there is inadequate support'in the 
law for the contention that a majority 
turnover in the UBMC board is required 
before the board can challenge the 
contract. See Mariano & Assocs., P.C v. 
Bd of County Comm'rs, 131 P.2d 323, 331 
(Wyo.1987) (concluding that precedent did 
not support argument that turnover in 
board was required before it could 
challenge validity of contract). 
In addition, Dr. Hardy argues that the 
successor UBMC board was precluded 
from terminating his contract because the 
board earlier ratified it. Since this issue 
was not raised below, we decline to 
address it. See Monson v. Carver, 928 
P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). 
A. Dr. Hardy's Contract Was Proprietary in 
Nature 
f 14 The factors on which courts have relied to 
distinguish between governmental and proprietary 
contracts strongly support the conclusion that Dr. 
Hardy's contract for pathological services involves a 
proprietary function. First, UBMC has not 
demonstrated that the services Dr. Hardy provides 
under the contract are "indispensable to the proper 
functioning of government." County Council v. SHL 
Systemhouse Corp., 60 F.Supp.2d 456, 465 
(E.D.Pa.1999). To the contrary, consistent with the 
view that Dr. Hardy's contract did not involve 
functions essential to governance, Duchesne County 
conveyed the hospital to a non-profit organization 
on July 3, 2000. 
^ 15 Moreover, under the terms of the contract, 
Dr. Hardy merely recommended, but did not have 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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authority to set, policies related to UBMC's 
pathology laboratory. The board's retention of this 
policymaking discretion weighs heavily in favor of 
deeming the contract proprietary. See Rhode 
Island Student Loan Auth. v. NELS, Inc., 550 A.2d 
624, 627 (R.I. 1988) (concluding contract was 
proprietary because contracting party "could neither 
exercise discretion nor set policy in performance of 
its duties"). 
K 16 Accordingly, we conclude that Dr. Hardy's 
contract involves a proprietary function. 
*1169 B. Whether Dr. Hardy's Contract Was of 
Reasonable Duration Depends on 
the Scope of the Contract's "Just Cause" Provision 
[7][8][9] f 17 Under the governmental/proprietary 
test, Dr. Hardy's proprietary contract is enforceable 
if its duration was reasonable at the time the parties 
executed the contract. Bair, 6 Utah 2d at 148, 307 
P.2d at 902. Whether a contract's duration is 
"reasonable" depends on the circumstances of each 
case. See, e.g., id, 6 Utah 2d at 143, 148, 307 
P.2d at 899, 903 (holding that a fifty-year sewage 
treatment contract was valid because its lengthy 
duration allowed city to obtain treatment facilities 
without undue delay and expense, and also 
facilitated long-term planning). Depending on the 
circumstances, a lengthy or indefinite contractual 
duration is not necessarily unreasonable. See id; 
see also Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d at 42, 448 P.2d 
at 354 (validating contract that required city to 
provide free water to land as long as the land served 
as the state capitol grounds, noting that city derives 
continuing economic benefit from capitol's 
presence). 
U 18 As the record has been inadequately 
developed on the issue of the reasonableness of the 
contract's duration, we remand to permit the district 
court to allow further development of the record 
and to then make this determination. On remand, 
as a preliminary matter, the district court should 
interpret the intended scope of the contract's "just 
cause" provision, [FN3] since the reasonableness of 
the contract's duration depends in large part on the 
amount of discretion this provision gives to 
successor boards. For example, if the "just cause" 
provision gives successor boards broad discretion to 
terminate Dr. Hardy (e.g., to improve patient care, 
for fiscal considerations), the contract is more likely 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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to be of a reasonable duration than if the "just 
cause" provision permitted termination only for 
deficient job performance. In evaluating whether 
the duration is reasonable, the district court may 
also find it useful to compare Dr. Hardy's contract 
to the agreements UBMC typically enters into with 
medical professionals. For example, UBMC's 
bylaws concerning its medical staff suggest that 
UBMC routinely enters into agreements under 
which the only practical durational limit is a 
liberally- construed "just cause" provision. [FN4] 
The extent to which the durational limitations in Dr. 
Hardy's contract conform to UBMC's usual 
practices in similar situations may factor into the 
district court's reasonableness assessment. 
FN3. See Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 
2002 UT 6, f 64, 44 P.3d 663 (noting that 
determination of scope of contractual 
"clause is a question of law for 
determination by the district court because 
it is a matter of contract interpretation"). 
FN4. Under UBMC's bylaws, although 
appointments to the medical staff are 
ostensibly limited to two years, staff 
members are reappointed unless there is 
"just cause." Under the bylaws, "just 
cause" appears to have a broad scope: for 
instance, the board may terminate a 
member of the medical staff for any reason 
"reasonably related to the delivery of 
quality patient care." 
T| 19 If* the district court determines that the 
contract's duration is reasonable, the contract is 
enforceable. The court should then determine 
whether the UBMC board had "just cause" to 
terminate Dr. Hardy. On the other hand, if the 
district court determines that the contract's duration 
is unreasonable, the court should not enforce the 
contract. 
[10][11] f 20 The dissent maintains that a term 
should be implied into Dr. Hardy's contract. In 
support of its argument, the dissent relies on canons 
of construction that have been developed to aid 
courts in discerning the parties' intent when a 
contract fails to specify a duration. We reject the 
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dissent's position for several reasons. First, and 
most importantly, neither party has argued in their 
briefs in favor of implying a term. To the contrary, 
both parties maintain that the contract should be 
evaluated as an indefinite-length contract whose 
duration is limited only by the "just cause" 
provision. [FN5] In effect, *1170 then, the parties 
have implicitly stipulated that the contract has an 
indefinite term. [FN6] Implying a term would 
therefore result in a contract that is contrary to the 
intent of either party and violate the preeminent 
goal of contractual interpretation (i.e., to give effect 
to the intent of the parties). Buehner Block Co. v. 
UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
Accordingly, because the parties agree that the 
contract should be treated as an indefinite-length 
contract, there is no need to rely on canons of 
construction for resolving ambiguities over whether 
the parties intended the contract be of indefinite 
duration. [FN7] 
FN5. Dr. Hardy asserts the following in his 
appellate brief: 
To entice excellent physicians to move to 
and remain in rural areas, hospitals often 
add perks to the contracts, including "just 
cause" termination provisions, or even 
"lifetime" contracts.... Given the 
necessities of the situation, such contracts 
are of reasonable duration. Thus, [Dr. 
Hardy's contract] passes the second part of 
the Bair test.... 
Appellant's Br. at 21. 
Despite disagreeing with Dr. Hardy on the 
ultimate conclusion of whether an 
indefinite-length contract with a "just 
cause" provision is of reasonable duration, 
UBMC clearly agrees that the contract was 
of indefinite duration: 
The potentially perpetual duration of Dr. 
Hardy's contract with UBMC was limited 
only by the "just cause" provision.... [Dr. 
Hardy's] contract bound Duchesne County 
indefinitely.... 
Appellee's Br. at 28-29. 
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FN7. The dissent acknowledges that "both 
parties contend that the contract should be 
evaluated as an indefinite-length contract 
limited only by just cause," yet nonetheless 
argues for the imposition of a fixed 
duration. The dissent has cited no cases, 
nor are we aware of any, in which we 
rejected parties' mutual concessions that 
are in harmony and clearly expressed. 
Given that the goal in interpreting 
contracts is to give effect to the intent of 
the parties, we should be particularly 
reluctant to reject the parties' stipulations 
or concessions in this case. 
The clear import of the parties' concessions 
is that the parties intended the contract to 
be of indefinite duration. The imposition 
of a fixed duration is therefore 
incompatible with the parties' concessions. 
Moreover, the law in Utah and numerous 
other jurisdictions recognizes the right of 
parties to enter into indefinite length 
contracts terminable for cause. Johnson v. 
Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 
1000-01 & n. 9 (Utah 1991); e.g., Shah v. 
Am. Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 
489, 491-92 (Ky.1983). In short, the 
imposition of a term would contradict the 
parties' stated intent, disregard their legal 
arguments, and impede their freedom to 
contract. This we decline to do. 
Significantly, the dissent also 
acknowledges that the parties have not 
argued in their appellate briefs that a term 
should be implied into the contract. In the 
absence of adequate briefing, it would be 
ill-advised for the court to raise this issue 
sua sponte, especially if the dissent is 
correct in asserting that this issue presents 
a question of first impression. Prince v. 
Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, \ 
59, 56P.3d 524, 2002 WL 1610562 ("On 
myriad occasions, we have held that we 
will not address issues inadequately 
briefed."). 
FN6. The dissent acknowledges that 
parties may enter into an indefinite-length 
contract. 
[12] \ 21 Second, conspicuously absent from the 
dissent's analysis is any citation to Utah precedent 
that supports its position. Contrary to the dissent's 
position, when a contract for employment or 
personal services does not recite a fixed term, the 
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law in Utah does not call for the judicial 
reformation of the contract to impose a term, 
especially where, as here, neither party disputes the 
contract was of indefinite duration. Indeed, in a 
case in which we traced the historical development 
of the law associated with employment contracts, 
we specifically noted that courts long ago 
repudiated a common law rule under which a term 
was implied when an employment contract did not 
specify a duration. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 
771 P.2d 1033, 1040-41 (Utah 1989). [FN8] In its 
place, courts in Utah and elsewhere adopted the 
at-will employment rule, under which employment 
contracts that did not specify a duration were 
generally presumed to be terminable at will. Id. at 
1041. In time, Utah recognized an exception under 
which an employee could rebut the at-will 
presumption associated with indefinite-length 
contracts by showing the parties intended the 
contract be terminable for cause. Johnson, 818 P.2d 
at 1000-01 & n. 9; see also Brehany v. Nordstrom, 
Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 54 (Utah 1991). Significantly, 
nothing in Johnson, Brehany, or Berube suggests 
that a court should sua sponte impose a term on an 
indefinite-length employment contract that provides 
for termination for cause. 
FN8. Although Berube was a plurality 
opinion, a majority of the court concurred 
in the portion of the opinion that traced the 
historical development of the common law 
of employment contracts. 
\ 22 Applying Utah precedent to Dr. Hardy's 
contract confirms our view that a term should not be 
read into the contract. First, because Dr. Hardy's 
contract does not specify a duration, under Utah law 
we initially presume it is of indefinite duration but 
terminable at will. Berube, 111 P.2d at 1040- 41. 
We do not apply the long-since rejected rule *1171 
that previously required the implication of a term. 
Id. Second, we consider whether any of the 
exceptions to the at-will rule applies. In this 
regard, we note that the parties expressly provided 
the contract was terminable for "just cause." We 
further note that the parties agree in their appellate 
briefs that the contract is of indefinite length and 
terminable only for "just cause." Accordingly, we 
conclude that the at-will presumption has been 
rebutted and Dr. Hardy's indefinite-length contract 
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is terminable for "just cause." Johnson, 818 P.2d at 
1000-01 & n. 9; see also Brehany, 812 P.2d at 54. 
[FN9] 
FN9. The cases cited by the dissent are (1) 
from other jurisdictions and therefore not 
binding and (2) are either distinguishable 
from, or inapposite to, the present case. 
In reaching its conclusion, the dissent 
relies heavily on cases not involving 
employment contracts. This reliance is 
tenuous given the fact that courts have 
developed a unique set of rules for 
employment and personal service 
contracts. See generally Berube, 111 P.2d 
at 1040-41; Consol Theatres, Inc. v. 
Theatrical Stage Employees Union, Local 
16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 73 Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 
P.2d 325, 335 & n. 12 (1968) (noting that 
due to special policy considerations 
associated with employment contracts, 
such contracts are exempt from rule 
applicable to other contracts under which 
courts imply a term when a contract is 
silent as to duration). 
For example, the dissent cites 
Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd. v. Bug's 
Imports, Inc., 453 S.W.2d 544, 549 
(Ky.1970) in support of its position. That 
case did not involve an employment 
contract, however, and, moreover, when 
faced with an employment contract, the 
relevant jurisdiction (Kentucky) relies on 
rules of interpretation specifically tailored 
to employment contracts. Shah v. Am. 
Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489, 
491-92 (Ky.1983) (confirming parties' 
right to enter into contracts under which 
person is employed for an indefinite period 
of time and may be terminated only for 
cause). Accordingly, the more pertinent 
case from the cited jurisdiction is 
consistent with the view that when an 
employment contract is silent as to 
duration, courts generally do not imply a 
fixed term of years. See id. Instead, as in 
Johnson, Kentucky courts presume such a 
contract is terminable at will unless the 
parties clearly express another criterion for 
termination (e.g., for cause). Id. 
The cases cited by the dissent that involve 
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employment contracts provide little 
support for its conclusion that a term must 
be imposed on Dr. Hardy's contract. For 
example, when faced with an 
indefinite-length employment contract, the 
court in Paisley v. Lucas did not impose a 
term but rather applied rules of 
construction specific to employment 
contracts. 346 Mo. 827, 143 S.W.2d 262, 
271 (1940). 
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(6th Cir.1985) (quoting Koyen v. Consol. Edison 
Co., 560 F.Supp. 1161, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y.1983)). 
"It is not difficult to determine the ... factors that are 
pertinent on prospective damage awards." Koyen, 
560 F.Supp. at 1168-69. Regardless, while the 
determination of damages presents challenges, so 
would the determination of a "reasonable" duration, 
especially when both parties on appeal appear 
resistant to the imposition of a term. 
CONCLUSION 
\ 23 Finally, we disagree with the dissent's 
contention that the imposition of a term is justified 
as a means of easing the calculation of prospective 
damages. [FN 10] The dissent itself concedes that 
parties can contract for an indefinite term. In 
making this concession, the dissent implicitly 
acknowledges that, to give effect to the parties' 
intent, courts inevitably and routinely need to 
determine damages associated with a breach of an 
indefinite employment contract. In making such 
determinations, courts have relied on various factors 
in addressing the kinds of concerns raised by the 
dissent: 
f 24 We conclude that Dr. Hardy's contract for 
pathological services is a proprietary *1172 
contract, and thus is enforceable against successor 
UBMC boards of trustees if it is of a reasonable 
duration. Accordingly, we remand to the district 
court to permit it to determine whether the 
contract's duration is reasonable. 
f 25 Remanded. 
f 2 6 Chief Justice DURHAM and Judge BENCH 
concur in Justice DURRANT's opinion. 
FN 10. The dissent asks the following: 
[If hospital breached the contract], how 
would Dr. Hardy's damages be calculated? 
Would Dr. Hardy be entitled to all of his 
loss of earnings under the indefinite 
contract? [W]ould he be entitled to 
compensation ... to the date of his death? 
To the date of his retirement? To the date 
of his inability to perform his job 
responsibilities ... ? 
While a district court has considerable experience 
in calculating future earnings, some basis must 
appear in the record for such an award. Some of 
the factors which district courts have employed to 
alleviate the speculative nature of future damage 
awards include an employee's duty to mitigate, 
"the availability of employment opportunities, the 
period within which one by reasonable efforts 
may be re-employed, the employee's work and 
life expectancy, the discount tables to determine 
the present value of future damages and other 
factors that are pertinent on prospective damage 
awards." 
Shore v. Fed. Express Corp., Ill F.2d 1155, 1160 
RUSSON, Justice, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
U 27 I concur with the majority opinion that the 
contract in question is proprietary in nature and 
could therefore bind the successor trustees of the 
hospital. However, I differ with the analysis of the 
opinion as to how the trial court is to determine the 
reasonableness of the duration of the contract on 
remand. 
f 28 Well-settled canons of contract construction 
and interpretation dictate that the trial court, when 
faced with a contract of employment that is silent as 
to its duration, and thus indefinite in length, but 
expressly terminable only for just cause, should 
determine by implication a reasonable term of 
duration under the circumstances and then imply 
that reasonable term into the contract as a matter of 
law. Once the trial court determines a reasonable 
term and implies it into the contract as a matter of 
law, the trial court then should evaluate the implied 
duration of the contract to determine if the duration 
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of the contract was reasonable for purposes of 
deciding whether the successor trustees of the 
hospital are bound by the contract. 
K 29 The employment contract between Uintah 
Basin Medical Center and Dr. Hardy did not 
include a specific term of duration and therefore 
was of indefinite duration or perpetual in nature. It 
did, however, expressly indicate that the contract 
could be terminated only for just cause. Corbin on 
Contracts provides guidance on how to treat such a 
contract and indicates what legal effect such a 
contract is to be given when it states: 
When parties make a contract of employment 
without specifying the length of service, but 
indicate that it is not terminable at will, the legal 
effect is that the parties are bound for a 
"reasonable time." This is based upon 
"implication" [i.e., the implication of a reasonable 
term of duration]. 
Catherine M.A. McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts 
§ 34.11, at 262 (revised ed.1999) (emphasis added); 
see also Consol. Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage 
Employees Union Local 16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 73 
Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d 325, 335 (1968) (en banc); 
Ansbacher-Siegle Corp. v. Miller Chem. Co., 137 
Neb. 142, 288 N.W. 538, 541 (1939); Tavel v. 
Olsson, 91 Nev. 359, 535 P.2d 1287, 1288 (1975); 
Smith v. Knutson, 16 N.D. 375, 36 N.W.2d 323, 
328 (1949), overruled on other grounds by 
Neibauer v. Well, 319 N.W.2d 143 (N.D. 1982); 
Hall v. Hall, 158 Tex. 95, 308 S.W.2d 12, 15 (1957) 
("Now it is doubtless true that, in contracts of the 
general type of the instant one [an employment 
contract for services], a term of reasonable duration 
may be implied, with the result that they are not 
void for lack of an essential provision and are not 
terminable at will."); Edwards v. 
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 61 Wash.2d 593, 379 P.2d 
735, 738 (1963); 27 Am.Jur.2d Employment 
Relationship § 38 (1996) (citing Shah v. Am. 
Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky.1983) 
). [FN1] *1173 This is precisely the situation 
presented in the instant case. 
FN1. The majority opinion criticizes this 
dissent for its citation to applicable, 
persuasive authority from the highest 
courts of our kindred states and dismisses 
that authority as nonbinding. Where this 
court has not addressed a particular 
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question of law and where authoritative 
precedent from our own jurisdiction is 
absent, this court has not been reluctant to 
seek out the experience, reasoning, and 
counsel of the decisions of other high 
courts as persuasive guidance in our 
deliberations. 
The majority opinion also criticizes the 
dissent for its citation to certain cases 
involving contracts other than for the 
provision of employment or personal 
services. However, all of the cases cited 
in this paragraph involve contracts for 
employment or personal services. 
This dissent does cite to other 
nonemployment contract cases later in f 
32 for the additional proposition that 
courts generally will imply a term of 
duration into indefinite-length contracts. 
The majority opinion maintains that those 
nonemployment cases are inapposite and 
that this dissent's reliance on them is 
tenuous because the courts have developed 
"a unique set of rules for employment and 
personal services contracts." To the 
extent that the cases mentioned by the 
majority opinion as recognizing special 
and different rules for employment 
contracts actually refer to special rules or 
policy considerations for employment 
contracts, they do so only in reference to 
the adoption of the general "at-will" 
employment doctrine and its exceptions. 
Those cases do not recognize special and 
different rules with respect to the propriety 
of implying a reasonable term into an 
employment contract that is silent as to its 
duration but outside of the "at-will" 
employment doctrine because of the 
explicit inclusion of an express "just 
cause" provision, such as the contract at 
issue here. In this regard, the majority 
opinion misreads Berube v. Fashion 
Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989), 
Consolidated Theatres, Inc., Shah, and 
Paisley v. Lucas, 346 Mo. 827, 143 
S.W.2d 262 (1940). The cases cited 
herein otherwise stand for the proposition 
for which they are cited and support the 
implication of duration for a reasonable 
period. 
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% 30 The determination of what constitutes a 
"reasonable time" of duration of the 
indefinite-length employment contract that is not 
terminable at will is either "(1) the time that seems 
reasonable in the light of the circumstances existing 
when the contract was made [or] (2) the time that 
seems reasonable in light of the circumstances as 
they occur during the course of performance." 
McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262. 
The reasonableness of an implied duration term is a 
question of fact and is determined in reference to 
the circumstances surrounding the transaction, the 
situation of the parties, and the subject matter of the 
contract. See William B. Tanner Co. v. Sparta 
Tomah-Broad Co., 716 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (7th 
Cir.1983); Metal Assocs., Inc. v. E. Side Metal 
Spinning & Stamping Corp., 165 F.2d 163, 165 (2d 
Cir.1947); Consol Theatres, Inc., 73 Cal.Rptr. 
213, 447 P.2d at 335; Brown Loan & Abstract Co. 
v. Willis, 150 Ga. 122, 102 S.E. 814, 815 (1920); 
Ansbacher-Siegle Corp., 288 N.W. at 541; Tavel, 
535 P.2d at 1288; Borough of W. Caldwell v. 
Borough of Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 138 A.2d 402, 412 
(1958); Hall, 308 S.W.2d at 16-17; 17B C.J.S. 
Contracts § 440 (1999); Margaret N. Kniffin, 5 
Corbin on Contracts § 24.29 (revised ed.1998). 
f 31 Corbin on Contracts ' suggested treatment of 
contracts of this nature is based upon and supported 
by well-settled principles and rules of contract 
construction and interpretation. In the instant case, 
the employment contract was silent as to its 
duration and therefore indefinite or perpetual. 
Contracts of perpetual duration are generally 
disfavored by the law. See Paisley v. Lucas, 346 
Mo. 827, 143 S.W.2d 262, 270 (1940) ("The courts 
are prone to hold against the theory that a contract 
confers a perpetuity of right or imposes a perpetuity 
of obligation." (quotation omitted)); see also 
Borough of W. Caldwell, 138 A.2d at 412; Farley 
v. Salow, 61 Wis.2d 393, 227 N.W.2d 76, 82 (1975) 
. Interpretations which avoid construing a contract 
to have an indefinite duration are preferable. See 
Borough of W. Caldwell, 138 A.2d at 412-13; 
Farley, 227 N.W.2d at 82; Kovachik v. Am. Auto. 
Ass'n, 5 Wis.2d 188, 92 N.W.2d 254, 256 (1958). 
Because the law disfavors contracts of perpetual 
performance or duration, courts will interpret a 
contract as being of indefinite duration only where 
the parties to the contract have clearly and 
unambiguously indicated their intentions to create a 
contract of indefinite duration through the use of 
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express and positive language to that effect in the 
contract. [FN2] See *U74William B. Tanner Co., 
716 F.2d at 1159 ("Courts are reluctant to interpret 
contracts providing for some perpetual or unlimited 
contractual right unless the contract clearly states 
that that is the intention of the parties."); 
Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd. v. Bug's Imps., Inc., 453 
S.W.2d 544, 549 (Ky.1970) ("The general rule is 
that a construction conferring a right in perpetuity 
will be avoided unless compelled by the 
unequivocal language of the contract."); Paisley, 
143 S.W.2d at 271 ("A contract [for employment] 
for life will be upheld only where the intention, that 
the contract's duration is for life, is clearly 
expressed in unequivocal terms."); Borough of W. 
Caldwell, 138 A.2d at 412-13 ("[A] construction 
affirming a [contractual performance] right in 
perpetuity is to be avoided unless given in clear and 
peremptory terms," and "[i]t is not often that a 
promise will properly be interpreted as calling for 
perpetual performance" (internal quotations 
omitted)); 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 439 (1999) ("[A] 
construction conferring a right in perpetuity will be 
avoided unless compelled by the unequivocal 
language of the contract [and] a contract which 
purports to run in perpetuity must be adamantly 
clear that that is the parties' intent, in order to be 
enforceable."). Likewise, employment contracts 
that do not explicitly express the parties' intentions 
that the contract be for lifetime or permanent 
employment have been held to be unenforceable or 
merely terminable at the will of either party. See 
Chastain v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 733 F.2d 
1479, 1482, 1484 (11th Cir.1984); Littell v. 
Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36, 37 
(D.C.Cir.1941); 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee 
Relationship § 23 (1992). 
FN2. The majority opinion notes that the 
parties have not argued in their appellate 
briefs that a term should be implied into 
the contract and that both parties contend 
that the contract should be evaluated as an 
indefinite-length contract limited only by 
the just cause provision. This incorrectly 
elevates the parties' arguments in the briefs 
to the level of an agreement between the 
parties on this point and treats it as a 
stipulation. Nothing in the record or the 
briefs indicates that the parties have 
stipulated in the manner the majority 
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opinion claims. The parties do not deny 
that they did not include an explicit 
provision in the contract expressing their 
intentions purposely to create an 
indefinite- length contract. If the parties 
to a contract intend to create an 
indefinite-length contract, they must 
express their intentions to do so through 
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal 
language in the contract. The parties' 
questionable "concession" in this regard in 
their briefs on appeal obviously fails to 
meet this standard and is contrary to the 
rule of law stated in the cited authority. 
Both Johnson and Shah may recognize the 
rights of parties to enter into 
indefinite-length contracts, but they do not 
dispute or contradict the requirement that 
the parties do so using explicit language in 
their contract. 
In any event, under normal circumstances, 
we will treat particular facts or issues as 
stipulated to by the parties only where such 
a stipulation is clear and expressed. 
Rarely, if ever, do we find a stipulation of 
this nature by implication. The notion of 
an implied stipulation is contrary to the 
very nature of a stipulation as a clear, 
definite, and certain agreement by the 
parties as to the truth or validity of a 
particular fact. 
Finally, the majority opinion also 
admonishes the dissent that "[i]n the 
absence of adequate briefing, it would be 
ill-advised for the court to raise [the issue 
of implying a reasonable term] sua sponte, 
especially [where] this issue presents a 
question of first impression." This, 
however, ignores our settled position that 
this court has inherent authority to 
consider arguments and issues that the 
parties have not raised or recognized if it is 
necessary to a proper decision and to avoid 
bad law. See Kaiserman Assocs., Inc. v. 
Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 
1998) ("[A]n overlooked or abandoned 
argument should not compel an erroneous 
result [and][w]e should not be forced to 
ignore the law just because the parties have 
not raised or pursued obvious 
arguments."). Simply because the parties 
did not recognize the issue on appeal or 
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because they are in supposed agreement in 
their argumentative position, erroneous as 
it may be, on appeal, we will not ignore a 
genuine legal issue or acquiesce in the 
parties' error and apply incorrect legal 
principles. 
f 32 Where a contract is of indefinite or perpetual 
duration because of the lack of an explicit term, the 
law will imply into the contract a term that is 
reasonable under the circumstances. See 
McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262; 
see also Metal Assocs., Inc., 165 F.2d at 165; 
Consol Theatres, Inc., 73 Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d 
at 335; Brown Loan & Abstract Co., 102 S.E. at 
815; Anne Arundel County v. Crofton Corp., 286 
Md. 666, 410 A.2d 228, 232 (1980); 
Ansbacher-Siegle Corp., 288 N.W. at 541; Tavel, 
535 P.2d at 1288; Borough of W. Caldwell, 138 
A.2d at 412-13; Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co., 
185 N.C. 479, 117 S.E. 706, 713-14 (1923); Harris 
v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502, 505 
(1897); Hall, 308 S.W.2d at 15; Farley, 227 
N.W.2d at 82; 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 546 
(1991); 27 Am.Jur.2d Employment Relationship § 
38 (1996) (citing Shah, 655 S.W.2d 489); 17B 
C.J.S. Contracts § 421 (1999); Kniffin, 5 Corbin on 
Contracts § 24.29. 
\ 33 The majority opinion criticizes this dissent 
for its lack of citation to Utah precedent in support 
of determining and implying a reasonable term of 
duration into the contract. This is empty criticism 
given that this case presents an issue of first 
impression in this jurisdiction. 
\ 34 The majority opinion incorrectly relies on 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1989), Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 
49 (Utah 1991), and Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 
Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991), as binding Utah 
authority that purportedly rejects the dissent's 
approach in this case. While the majority is correct 
in noting "that nothing in Johnson, Brehany, or 
Berube suggests that a court should sua sponte 
impose a term on an indefinite-length employment 
contract that provides for termination for cause," 
nothing in those decisions *1175 would prohibit the 
implication of a reasonable term into the contract 
either. Those cases simply do not go as far as 
articulating a governing rule applicable to the case 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
54P.3d 1165 
19 IER Cases 9,455 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 2002 UT 92 
(Cite as: 54 P.3d 1165) 
at hand and are focused on a separate and discrete 
issue not present in the instant case. 
If 35 Specifically, the majority opinion's assertion 
that in Berube we noted (and purportedly endorsed) 
the notion that "courts long ago repudiated a 
common law rule under which a term was implied 
when an employment contract did not specify a 
duration" is not entirely correct and overstates 
Berube. The central issue in Berube was whether 
the termination-related provisions of an employer's 
employee handbook could be implied into the 
employment contract as implied-in-fact contract 
terms between the employer and employee such that 
the original indefinite-length employment contract 
would escape application of the "at-will" 
employment doctrine that provides an 
indefinite-length employment contract is terminable 
by either party for good cause, cause, or no cause at 
all. 
| 36 In the "historical development" portion of 
Justice Durham's plurality opinion in Berube, to 
which the majority opinion in this case cites, Justice 
Durham merely traced the historical development 
and adoption of the "at-will" employment doctrine 
in the United States. 
Tf 37 In any event, that section of Berube does not 
stand for the proposition offered by the majority 
opinion. The historical review section of the 
Berube plurality opinion simply described the 
nineteenth century English common law rule stating 
that English courts, when faced with employment 
contracts of indefinite duration, would imply an 
arbitrary one-year term into the contract. Berube, 
111 P.2d at 1040-41; see also McCauliff, 8 Corbin 
on Contracts § 3 4.11, at 257. Berube 's historical 
review merely noted that American courts rejected 
the arbitrary one-year term implied by English 
courts in favor of the "at-will" employment 
doctrine. Berube, 111 P.2d at 1040- 41. Berube 
simply acknowledged the historical rejection of the 
implication of a term of duration in an "at-will" 
employment contract. See id. It does not, as the 
majority opinion claims, reject the notion that a 
reasonable term could or should be implied into an 
employment contract that is by its own terms 
outside the "at-will" employment doctrine because 
of a just cause provision such that the parties are 
bound for a "reasonable time." See McCauliff, 8 
Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262. In fact, 
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Justice Durham's opinion in Berube notes that the 
rejection of the English common law implied 
one-year term and the adoption of the "at-will" 
employment doctrine in the United States was 
"adopted by many jurisdictions without careful or 
thorough examination." Berube, 111 P.2d at 1040. 
Thus, the most Berube can be cited for in this 
regard is the proposition that American courts 
uncritically rejected the arbitrary one-year implied 
term rule used by the English courts, but not the 
apparently unconsidered, yet supportable, notion 
that a reasonable term could or should be implied 
into an indefinite-length employment contract that 
by its own terms is not terminable at will. See 
McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262. 
Therefore, the majority opinion's statement in 
applying purportedly controlling Utah precedent to 
this case that "[w]e do not apply the long-since 
rejected rule that previously required the 
implication of a term" is based on a 
misinterpretation of Berube 's historical review. 
Regardless, this portion of the plurality Berube 
opinion, despite being joined by a majority of the 
court, was at best dicta in that it was historical 
exposition. Berube and its progeny simply do not 
prohibit the implication of a reasonable term into 
the contract at hand and are not binding precedent 
that govern whether a term of duration should be 
implied into the contract at issue. 
f^ 38 Finally, Johnson and Brehany likewise do 
not govern the present case or bar the imposition of 
an implied reasonable term of duration into the 
contract. Brehany and Johnson, like Berube, were 
employee handbook or implied-in-fact contract term 
cases but go no further than Berube in their 
holdings and no more state an on-point or 
governing rule applicable in this case than does 
Berube. 
If 39 Berube, Brehany, and Johnson all involved 
indefinite- length employment contracts and claims 
of wrongful termination. *1176 However, these 
cases merely explore and set rules for determining 
whether a plaintiff employee's claim for wrongful 
termination can escape the general "at-will" 
employment doctrine. In other words, in those 
cases, this court was asked to determine whether an 
implied-in-fact term existed which would remove 
the contract from the general "at-will" employment 
doctrine under which a plaintiff employee could not 
sustain a wrongful termination action. If such an 
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implied-in-fact term was found to exist, for example 
where an employer's employee handbook specified 
exclusive reasons for termination of its employees, 
then those provisions of the employment handbook 
were treated as implied-in-fact contract terms, 
removing the employment contract from the "at-
will" employment doctrine rules and preventing the 
employer from terminating the contract for any or 
no cause. 
T[ 40 The case at hand involves an 
indefinite-length contract which contained an 
express "just cause" provision. Because that 
provision was expressed, the analysis and rules in 
Berube, Brehany, and Johnson are not applicable; 
we already know that the express "just cause" 
provision takes us out of the general "at-will" 
employment doctrine rule. The issue here is how 
the trial court is to determine whether the duration 
of the contract is reasonable and how it is to arrive 
at such a reasonable duration. This is a question 
not previously addressed to this court and to which 
Berube, B rehany, and Johnson are not instructive. 
The legal propositions and rules of contract 
construction and interpretation presented in this 
dissent are more appropriate for use by the trial 
court in adjudicating this controversy on remand. 
| 41 Once the trial court determines the 
reasonable term under the circumstances and that 
term is implied by law into the contract, the contract 
will necessarily be enforceable against the 
succeeding board under the second prong of the Bair 
test articulated in the majority opinion because (1) 
the activity contracted for is proprietary and (2) the 
term or duration that was implied into the contract 
is de facto reasonable under the circumstances. 
| 42 Having determined the reasonable duration 
of the contract, and therefore its enforceability, the 
trial court must then determine if the hospital 
breached the contract when it terminated Dr. Hardy. 
It could terminate him before the expiration of the 
implied term only for "just cause." If the trial court 
determines that the hospital had just cause to 
terminate the contract with Dr. Hardy, the hospital 
did not breach the contract and Dr. Hardy is not 
entitled to damages. If the trial court determines 
that the hospital did not have just cause to terminate 
the contract with Dr. Hardy, then the hospital 
breached the contract and Dr. Hardy is entitled to 
damages calculated consistent with the reasonable 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
Page 13 
employment duration term implied into the contract. 
See Bad Wound v. Lakota Cmty. Homes, Inc., 
1999 SD 165, T[ 11, 603 N.W.2d 723, 726. 
U 43 Under the majority opinion's analysis, Dr. 
Hardy's damages, assuming the hospital is liable to 
Dr. Hardy for terminating him without just cause, 
would be speculative, at best, and undeterminable, 
at worst, absent a finite term of duration in the 
contract. See Benham v. World Airways, Inc., 432 
F.2d 359, 360, 361-62 (9th Cir.1970); Sterling 
Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 
380, 386-87 (1988). It is for this reason that the 
law disfavors contracts of perpetual duration and 
why, when faced with contracts of indefinite 
duration, courts will imply a reasonable term of 
duration. If on remand the perpetual contract is 
held to be enforceable and the trial court determines 
that the hospital did not have just cause to terminate 
the contract, how would Dr. Hardy's damages be 
calculated? Would Dr. Hardy be entitled to all of 
his loss of earnings under the indefinite contract? 
In other words, would he be entitled to 
compensation under the contract from the date of 
termination to the date of his death? To the date of 
his retirement? To the date of his inability to 
perform his job responsibilities, whenever that 
might be? Determining a reasonable term for the 
contract under the circumstances and implying it 
into the contract would avoid the possibility of 
speculative or undeterminable damages. 
*1177 If 44 The majority opinion disagrees that 
imposition of a definite term is justified and argues 
that the trial court would face similar "challenges" 
in determining a reasonable term of duration under 
the circumstances as it would in determining Dr. 
Hardy's speculative damages. The approach 
advocated in this dissent would focus the trial 
court's attention and efforts on the discrete task of 
discerning a reasonable term for the contract under 
the circumstances, thus centering the inquiry on the 
parties' intentions, the nature of the parties' 
relationship, and the overall circumstances 
surrounding the formation of the contract at issue. 
See McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 
262. The majority opinion's suggestion for 
determining Dr. Hardy's potential damages would 
take the trial court's attention away from the 
contract itself and the context in which it was 
formulated and focus on myriad distant and less 
related factors, all of which remain at least to some 
• Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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19 IER Cases 9,455 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 2002 UT 92 
(Cite as: 54 P.3d 1165) 
extent speculative in nature. I would not send the 
trial court into the majority opinion's briar patch of 
thorny factors. In this case, [FN3] it would be far 
less complicated and less speculative for the trial 
court to determine Dr. Hardy's potential damages in 
relation to an implied reasonable term. 
FN3. The majority opinion also argues that 
under the dissent's analysis courts will 
"inevitably and routinely need to determine 
damages associated with a breach of an 
indefinite employment contract." This is 
incorrect. The vast majority of cases 
involving issues of termination under 
indefinite-length employment contracts 
will be governed by the "at- will" 
employment doctrine. In those instances, 
the issue of damages would not arise 
because the employment relationship 
would be terminable by either party for 
any reason. The problematic issue of 
damages arises only in the very rare and 
unique case, such as the one at hand, where 
an expressed or implied "just cause" term 
is a part of the indefinite duration contract, 
thus removing the case from the 
application of the usual "at-will" 
employment doctrine rule. 
K 45 I would remand to the trial court but with 
instructions consistent with this concurring opinion. 
f 46 Justice HOWE concurs in Justice RUSSON's 
concurring and dissenting opinion. 
54 P.3d 1165, 19 IER Cases 9, 455 Utah Adv. Rep. 
36, 2002 UT 92 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D., 
Defendant. 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D., 
Counterclaimant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
I/O 
Vo. 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, 
Counterclaim Defendant 
and Third-Party Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 990000109 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The Court having received plaintiffs Post-Remand Motion for Summary Judgment, or in 
the Alternative, Rule 42 Motion to Bifurcate, defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Post-Remand 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and plaintiffs Reply Memorandum, having received argument, 
reviewed the pleadings, and being otherwise fully informed enters the following: 
The issue before the Court is whether Dr. Hardy's contract was of a reasonable duration 
and therefore enforceable, and if the contract is enforceable, whether just cause existed pursuant 
to the contract to terminate Dr. Hardy. Based upon the following, the Court does not need to 
reach the latter issue. 
As instructed by the Utah Supreme Court in Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 54 
P.3d 1165 (Utah 2002), the Court must first interpret the intended scope of the just cause 
provision to determine the reasonableness of the duration of the contract. It is proper for the 
Court to make this determination at this time due to the determihation of the scope of the 
contractual just cause clause being a question of law as a matter of contract interpretation. See 
Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 54 P.3d 1165, 1169 Fn3 (quoting Miller v. USAACas. 
Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663 (Utah, 2002)). As suggested by the Utah Supreme Court, if the just cause 
provision is broad in its discretion to subsequent boards, then the contract should be found to be 
of a reasonable duration. Conversely, if the intended scope of the just cause pro/vision is 
limiting on successor boards, the contract is unreasonable and should not be enforced. 
It is apparent from the record established before the Court, that at the time of executing 
the contract Dr. Hardy believed the just cause clause to mean that he could only be terminated for 
a few specific reasons, including death, physical incapacity, or if the hospital no longer required 
pathology services. See Deposition of Leo W. Hardy, M.D., July 26, 1999. Dr. Hardy did further 
explain his position during the deposition to add that he felt as long as pathological services were 
required by the hospital, Uintah Basin Medical Center was contractually obligated to continue 
employing him. Dr. Hardy, through his declaration, has introduced a later interpretation of the 
just cause clause as including other factors that could constitute just cause, inter alia, closure of 
the hospital or elimination of pathological services. It is interesting to note that Dr. Hardy's 
declaration was introduced after the Utah Supreme Court issued their ruling on this matter. It 
appears Dr. Hardy has attempted to re-draft his interpretation of the just cause clause to more 
similarly mirror the higher Court's opinion. As counsel for plaintiff correctly noted, when Dr. 
Hardy took a clear position during his deposition, which was not modified on cross-examination, 
the later definition raised by Dr. Hardy through his declaration cannot be relied upon. Therefore, 
it appears that Dr. Hardy's position taken at his deposition truly represents his understanding of 
the intended scope of the just cause clause at the time the contract was executed. Given Dr. 
Hardy's understanding of the intended scope of the just cause clause in light of the Utah Supreme 
Court's opinion, the contract offered little discretion to successor boards. As such, the contract 
cannot be viewed as including a reasonable duration. 
When comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to those typically entered into by Uintah Basin 
Medical Center with other medical professionals, it becomes even more apparent that Dr. 
Hardy's contract was unreasonable. As exhibit G to plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Post-
Remand Motion for Summary Judgment clearly indicates, Dr. Hardy's contract was unusual in 
the sense that no time duration was included in the contract, nor did his contract contain the 
typical provision providing either party the right to terminate the contract at any time after giving 
the appropriate notice. Dr. Hardy's argument that he was a hospital-based physician and 
therefore could not initiate his own income, but was referred work by other physicians is not well 
taken. Comparison of Dr. Hardy's contract to other similarly situated hospital-based physicians, 
such as surgeons, shows that his contract was still unusual in not providing a specific time 
limitation on the contract and the provision allowing either party to terminate the contract given 
the appropriate notice period. There is sufficient evidence before the Court to make this 
determination through comparison of Dr. Hardy's contract to those included in plaintiffs exhibit 
G. Although Dr. Stewart's contract is also atypical in that it contains specific conditions 
regarding when termination can occur, it does not refute the fact that when comparing Dr. 
Hardy's contract to other medical professionals typically entered into by Uintah Basin Medical 
Center, the vast majority of those contracts provide a specific duration, and a provision allowing 
either party to terminate the contract after giving the appropriate notice. Additionally, the fact 
that Uintah Basin Medical Center entered into such a dissimilar contract with Dr. Hardy bolsters 
the idea that the intended scope of the just cause clause in the contract limited successor boards' 
discretion in terminating Dr. Hardy as noted above. Obviously, failure to include a provision that 
allowed termination by either party after appropriate notice in the contract limits successor 
boards ability to terminate Dr. Hardy. This fact, along with the unusual nature of the contract, 
and Dr. Hardy's own statement as to the intended scope of the just cause clause, lead the Court to 
the inevitable conclusion that the contract's just cause clause unreasonably limited the discretion 
of successor boards and is therefore of an unreasonable duration. As such, as Justice Durrant's 
opinion indicates, the Court must find the contract is unenforceable. 
Because the Court concludes the intended scope of the just cause clause provided limited 
discretion to future boards, and is unusual when comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to other 
contracts typically entered into by Uintah Basin Medical Center with other medical professionals, 
and as such the contracts duration was unreasonable making the contract unenforceable, the 
Court does not need to determine whether or not just cause existed under the contract to 
terminate Dr. Hardy. 
Based upon the above, it is hereby ORDERED plaintiff's Post-Remand Motion for 
Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
Dated this / ^ " d a y of June, 2003. 
BY 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 990000109 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail BLAINE J BENARD 
ATTORNEY PLA 
299 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SUITE 1800 
SLC, UT 84111-22S3 
Mail JOHN P HARRINGTON 
ATTORNEY DEF 
60 E SOUTH TEMPLE #2 000 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
By Hand CLARK B ALLRED 
Dated this "30 day of C A ^ ^ , 2 0 ^'3, 
%T 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
TabD 
JOHN P. HARRINGTON (5242) 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031 
Telephone: (801) 595-7800 
Facsimile: (801) 364-9124 
SARAH M. BTRKELAND (9495) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendant Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
ROOSEVELT DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D., 
Defendant. 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D., 
Counterclaimant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
V. 
UTNTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER and 
THOMAS J. ALLRED, M.D., 
Counterclaim Defendants 
and Third-Party Defendants. 
DECLARATION OF 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D. 
Trial Court No. 990000109CV 
Judge John R. Anderson 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
SS. 
I, Leo W. Hardy, M.D., being over twenty-one years of age and of sound mind, 
declare and state under the penalties of perjury as follows: 
1. After the completion of my pathology residency in June, 1994, I have 
worked with Dr. Joseph Sannella, M.D., a pathologist who provided pathology services 
to various rural hospitals. Dr. Sannella was preparing to retire and introduced me to 
various physicians and administrators associated with those rural hospitals in anticipation 
of my assuming the duties of Dr. Sannella.. 
2. I was introduced to the Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC") (then 
known as Duchesne County Hospital) by Dr. Sannella. Dr. Sannella indicated to UBMC 
that I was capable of providing the pathology services for UBMC on a similar basis as 
Dr. Sannella, which included, among other things, providing anatomic and clinical 
pathology services, an in-person weekly visit to UBMC, medical directorship of the 
UBMC lab, consultations with UBMC physicians, etc. 
3. Joe Hockett, the lab supervisor at UBMC, indicated that UBMC would 
like to enter into a contract with me regarding my providing pathology services to 
UBMC. Mr. Hockett gave me a copy of Dr. Sannella's contract with UBMC dated 
September 21, 1992 ("Dr. Sannella's Contract"). Paragraph 11 of Dr. Sannella's 
Contract had a "just cause" provision: ". . . until terminated after ninety (90) days written 
notice for just cause of termination by either party or by mutual consent of the parties to a 
shorter notice period." I used Dr. Sannella's contract as a template for my own contract 
and the "just cause" provision of Paragraph 11 remained. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
is a copy of Dr. Sannella's Contract with my handwritten revisions. I gave the copy of 
Dr. Sannella's contract with my revisions to Mr. Hockett who then had the contract typed 
on the letterhead of Duchesne County Hospital. Mr. Bradley LeBaron reviewed and 
signed the contract. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a copy of my contract with UBMC 
dated November 29, 1994 (the "Agreement"). 
2 
4. At the time that I entered into the Agreement with UBMC, I was 
concerned about the duration of the contract. If I was going to commit a considerable 
amount of time and professional resources to service the pathology needs of UBMC and 
its physicians and patients, then I wanted a secure contract that would allow me to 
perform the required pathology services and to appropriately expand my services and 
meet any potential increased demands of UBMC. If UBMC experienced increased need 
for pathology services, I wanted to expand and invest in my practice to accommodate 
those increased needs. Therefore, so long as I was capable of performing the best quality 
pathology services to all patients, I needed the contractual commitment of UBMC that 
they would not terminate the Agreement for any indiscriminate reason. Knowing that 
UBMC had made that same commitment to Dr. Sannella, I included the "just cause" 
provision in the Agreement and foresaw no reason that UBMC would not honor their 
contractual commitment to me. 
5. Pursuant to the Agreement, UBMC would be permitted to terminate the 
Agreement upon the occurrence of "just cause". Just cause would occur if I was unable 
to perform my duties as a pathologist for UBMC. If I was physically unable to perform 
(e.g., death, disability, old age, etc.), then UBMC would certainly be able to terminate the 
Agreement. If my performance was less than satisfactory (e.g., professional 
incompetency or inability to get along with the UBMC physicians), then just cause would 
have occurred. Certainly the loss of my Utah Medical license or sanctions by an 
appropriate regulatory body would constitute just cause. 
6. There are other circumstances that would constitute just cause that are 
unrelated to my performance as a pathologist. If the Duchesne County Commissioners 
3 
decided to close UBMC, then the UBMC Board of Trustees would have just cause to 
temiinate the Agreement. If the Duchesne County Commissioners materially changed 
the nature of the hospital whereby pathology services were not needed, then my 
Agreement could be terminated. For example, if UBMC no longer performed surgery or 
other medical procedures that require pathology services, then my Agreement could be 
terminated. But while UBMC had any need for pathology services, UBMC contractually 
agreed that I was the medical doctor to perform those services. It is very hard to imagine 
the medical specialty of pathology being eliminated or no longer needed, but if that 
happened, then UBMC could temiinate my Agreement. If UBMC perceived a need for 
changes in scope or manner of the provided pathology services, I expected them to 
approach me regarding such a need, and if jointly agreed upon, I would have adjusted 
accordingly. If I could not accommodate these changes, then UBMC would be free to 
temiinate the Agreement, hi essence, UBMC would have just cause to terminate my 
Agreement if I failed to perform or something substantial changed as to the need of 
UBMC for pathology services (e.g., hospital closure) which may be caused by financial 
concerns. Those financial concerns, however, could not include merely getting a lower 
price for the pathology services or histology lab supervision. The financial concerns 
would have to be of such magnitude that the governmental policy-making function of the 
Duchesne County Commissioners would be involved (e.g., hospital closure). 
7. UBMC could not terminate my Agreement to hire another pathologist 
while I was providing UBMC with the level of satisfactory pathology services that I was. 
Prior to the decision of the UBMC Board of Trustees made on July 18, 1996, there was 
no indication whatsoever that my pathology services were inadequate or unsatisfactory. 
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hi fact, UBMC physicians had continually praised my performance. I have been shown 
no evidence that financial considerations entered into UBMC's decision to terminate my 
Agreement. UBMC never discussed any financial concerns with my Agreement or the 
cost of the pathology services I was providing. As to UBMC's alleged desire to have an 
on-site resident pathologist, Brad LeBaron did not discuss that issue with me or request 
that I move to Roosevelt, Utah. There is no question in my mind that UBMC did not 
have sufficient needs for a full time pathologist. The quantity and quality of pathology 
services I was providing the physicians at UBMC met all of their needs at a nationally 
comparable and cost-effective price. 
8. If UBMC had need of pathology services that I could not provide them, 
then UBMC would have just cause to terminate my Agreement. However, UBMC did 
not have any pathology service needs that I could not provide in a timely and efficient 
manner, nor did they have any perceived needs for services on-site or other services that I 
could not meet. As to their alleged desire to have an on-site pathologist who lived in 
Roosevelt, they never presented me with an opportunity to meet that desire. 
Dated this _/£_J day of April, 2003. 
Leo W. Hara 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of April, 2003. 
Notary Public 
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(Declaratory Judgment Action) 
„ FILED 
_,,, DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE C O t ' $ v W 
Jk- ism 
««>ANNEMcK|E1CLEflK 
' " • •• .DEPUTY 
#148768 vl 
For the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling Granting Plaintiffs Post Remand Motion 
for Summary Judgment, dated June 19, 2003, attached hereto, Defendant's counterclaims are 
dismissed with prejudice and Plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief is granted. 
DATED this JOV-day of^JAWl ^ , 2003. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
HOLLAND & HART 
Ion. John R. Anderson 
/District Court Judge 
* & JcftinfP. Haitiflgton 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEO W. HARDY, M.D., 
Defendant. 
LEOW HARDY, M D , 
Counterclaim ant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
Vb. 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, 
Counterclaim Defendant 
and Third-Party Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 990000109 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The Court having received plaintiffs Post-Remand Motion for Summary Judgment, or in 
the Alternative, Rule 42 Motion to Bifurcate, defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Post-Remand 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and plaintiffs Reply Memorandum, having received argument, 
reviewed the pleadings, and being otherwise fully informed enters the following: 
The issue before the Court is whether Dr. Hardy's contract was of a reasonable duration 
and therefore enforceable, and if the contract is enforceable, whether just cause existed pursuant 
to the contract to terminate Dr. Hardy. Based upon the following, the Court does not need to 
reach the latter issue. 
As instructed by the Utah Supreme Court in Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 54 
P. 3d 1165 (Utah 2002), the Court must first interpret the intended scope of the just cause 
provision to determine the reasonableness of the duration of the contract. It is proper for the 
Court to make this determination at this time due to the determination of the scope of the 
contractual just cause clause being a question of law as a matter of contract interpretation. See 
Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 54 P.3d 1165, 1169 Fn3 (quoting Miller v. USAACas. 
Ins, Co., 44 P.3d 663 (Utah, 2002)). As suggested by the Utah Supreme Court, if the just cause 
provision is broad in its discretion to subsequent boards, then the contract should be found to be 
of a reasonable duration. Conversely, if the intended scope of the just cause pro/vision is 
limiting on successor boards, the contract is unreasonable and should not be enforced. 
It is apparent from the record established before the Court, that at the time of executing 
the contract Dr. Hardy believed the just cause clause to mean that he could only be terminated for 
a few specific reasons, including death, physical incapacity, or if the hospital no longer required 
pathology services. See Deposition of Leo W. Hardy, M.D., July 26, 1999. Dr. Hardy did further 
explain his position during the deposition to add that he felt as long as pathological services were 
required by the hospital, Uintah Basin Medical Center was contractually obligated to continue 
employing him. Dr. Hardy, through his declaration, has introduced a later interpretation of the 
just cause clause as including other factors that could constitute just cause, inter alia, closure of 
the hospital or elimination of pathological services. It is interesting to note that Dr. Hardy's 
declaration was introduced after the Utah Supreme Court issued their ruling on this matter. It 
appears Dr. Hardy has attempted to re-draft his interpretation of the just cause clause to more 
similarly mirror the higher Court's opinion. As counsel for plaintiff correctly noted, when Dr. 
Hardy took a clear position during his deposition, which was not modified on cross-examination, 
the later definition raised by Dr. Hardy through his declaration cannot be relied upon. Therefore, 
it appears that Dr. Hardy's position taken at his deposition truly represents his understanding of 
the intended scope of the just cause clause at the time the contract was executed. Given Dr. 
Hardy's understanding of the intended scope of the just cause clause in light of the Utah Supreme 
Court's opinion, the contract offered little discretion to successor boards. As such, the contract 
cannot be viewed as including a reasonable duration. 
When comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to those typically entered into by Uintah Basin 
Medical Center with other medical professionals, it becomes even more apparent that Dr. 
Hardy's contract was unreasonable. As exhibit G to plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Post-
Remand Motion for Summary Judgment clearly indicates, Dr. Hardy's contract was unusual in 
the sense that no time duration was included in the contract, nor did his contract contain the 
typical provision providing either party the right to terminate the contract at any time after giving 
the appropriate notice. Dr. Hardy's argument that he was a hospital-based physician and 
therefore could not initiate his own income, but was referred work by other physicians is not well 
taken. Comparison of Dr. Hardy's contract to other similarly situated hospital-based physicians, 
such as surgeons, shows that his contract was still unusual in not providing a specific time 
limitation on the contract and the provision allowing either party to terminate the contract given 
the appropriate notice period. There is sufficient evidence before the Court to make this 
determination through comparison of Dr. Hardy's contract to those included in plaintiffs exhibit 
G. Although Dr. Stewart's contract is also atypical in that it contains specific conditions 
regarding when termination can occur, it does not refute the fact that when comparing Dr. 
Hardy's contract to other medical professionals typically entered into by Uintah Basin Medical 
Center, the vast majority of those contracts provide a specific duration, and a provision allowing 
either party to terminate the contract after giving the appropriate notice. Additionally, the fact 
that Uintah Basin Medical Center entered into such a dissimilar contract with Dr. Hardy bolsters 
the idea that the intended scope of the just cause clause in the contract limited successor boards' 
discretion in terminating Dr. Hardy as noted above. Obviously, failure to include a provision that 
allowed termination by either party after appropriate notice in the contract limits successor 
boards ability to terminate Dr. Hardy. This fact, along with the unusual nature of the contract, 
and Dr. Hardy's own statement as to the intended scope of the just cause clause, lead the Court to 
the inevitable conclusion that the contract's just cause clause unreasonably limited the discretion 
of successor boards and is therefore of an unreasonable duration. As such, as Justice Durrant's 
opinion indicates, the Court must find the contract is unenforceable. 
Because the Court concludes the intended scope of the just cause clause provided limited 
discretion to future boards, and is unusual when comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to other 
contracts typically entered into by Uintah Basin Medical Center with other medical professionals, 
and as such the contracts duration was unreasonable making the contract unenforceable, the 
Court does not need to determine whether or not just cause existed under the contract to 
terminate Dr. Hardy. 
Based upon the above, it is hereby ORDERED plaintiffs Post-Remand Motion for 
Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
Dated this / ^ " d a y of June, 2003. / 0 " " 
BY TfflCQK]W:s) 
John R. Anderson, District Court Judge 
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We appreciate y *r response to our request to have .i formal agreement in handling our 
Pathology need<. Listed below is the proposal submuied by you. I have reviewed this with 
Joe Hokett and L iry Beck and have found that it meets the needsof Duchesne County 
Hospital at this i me. Our agreement therefore includes the following-
1. Dr Sannella agrees to personally visit the Duchesne County Hospital Lab 
\vr:kly or wiJJ have another pathologist visit the hospital if he is unavailable. 
2. V i- its will not be substituted wi(h technologists Duration ol visit will be for 
one to two hours devoted to the following activities: 
a. CAP proficiency survey reviews 
b. Review of Duchesne County Hospital QC program. 
c. Recommending processes to investigate technical and administrative 
problems and advise adoption of policies and/or procedures for 
correction. 
e. Develop liaison with all full time medical staff members to enable full 
understanding of laboratory's role in supporting medical staffs mission. 
Beginning in November, the pathologist will attend Medical Staff 
meetings eveqrothag month— This meeting will be considered that 
week's laboratory visit. QL u^^ 
3. Th* visiting pathologist will be available to tne medical staff for help with 
interpretation of laboratory results. This would be a physician to physician 
consult. 
4. Tht visiting pathologist will be available for more complex consultations, bone 
mairow biopsies, pe^^ai^ggEfaieedk-bioyiWi of lui^ etfuor fine needle 
asp ation biopsy of superficial masses (i.e., breast, thyroid, lymph node). 
Pro' edures in these categories will be direct patient services and will be billed 
as such. 
5. The visiting pathologist will also undertake teaching activities for both medical 
staff and laboratory staff when new procedures are to be introduced 
6. Every opportunity to educate laboratory staff in those areas where new 
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information or t! need for better understanding of the need for clinical 
consultation, wili be pursued. 
7. As Laboratory D rector, I will take responsibility for continued CAP 
accreditation, inc tiding interim self-inspection, review of manuals, and all 
activities CAP h: : identified as Laboratory Director responsibilities. 
8. DCH is permitte to formally register me with the State of Utah and CAP as 
laboratory Dire; r, and inclusion of my name on any and all laboratory 
reports, thus doc men ting my medicolegal relationship^ with thfe^DCH 
Laboratory. , """7) 
9. DCH will pay a . -boratory Director's fee oK$400.00 per month/ This wttTES 
JjiCFeased-to-SStX'. .00 per-montion suhsequent-yeafsr " 
10. Ifan;[ wjierr. unr!-? separate, ag*eement/kll surgical pathology and extra-genital 
cytology is re fen ci to the Laboratory Director's practice, additional activities 
such as medical . -ff committee work, will be undertaken. These may include 
Infection Control Tissue Reviews, .Surgical Case Review, Transfusion 
Committee, or B! x>d utilization Review, and involvement in hospital-wide 
ContinuingQualit Improvement. /V?*^ '
 / I ? ? V 
11. This agreement s* all become effective Qfitebcrt7T992 and continue to bind 
the parties to the erms hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days written 
notice for just ca^  se of termination by either party or by mutual consent of the 
parties to a short- •- notice period. 
Your signature below indicates >oin acceptance oJ the responsibilities, services and benefits 
listed above. 
Sincerely, 
Administrator 
Jo^hJLSainella , M.D., P.C 
<J2 • (^l-^r^T *^^ -' L.x^*> & ' ~r**  '"^ -r) 7-
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AGREEMENT 
lis agreement is entered into between DUCHESNE COUNTY HOSPITAL, herein "the hospital" 
id a professional radiologist, Dr. Wayne T. Stewart 
The hospital requires the radiology services in meeting the needs of hospital 
atients and desires to contract with individuals and/or organizations to provide those 
ervices. It is proposed that we contract with Dr. Wayne Thomas Stewart, a physician, 
pecializing in the field of radiology, with his place of business being in Roosevelt, Utah, 
r. Wayne Thomas Stewart represents and has demonstrated that he has the training and 
xpertise to provide the needed radiology services, and to assist the hospital in the 
drainistration of its radiology department, and in this agreement with Dr. Stewart, the 
ospital is relying upon those qualifications. The parties have entered into and will now 
perate under an agreement similar to that herein proposed. By this contract, the parties 
esire to set forth the rights and obligations of each party, and the provisions hereof. 
Therefore, inconsideration of the promises to each made, the parties do hereby agree: 
(1) The hospital will operate, maintain and administer the business of its 
Radiology Department, including the hiring, discharge and scheduling of personnel; 
the acquisition and maintenence of equipment, the acquisition of supplies, and all 
other administrative functions of the department. Dr. Stewart will be consulted in 
all of these matters. 
(2) Dr. Stewart will retain the position and title of "Director of Medical 
Imaging", and will assume and discharge all responsibility for the medical operation 
of the department, in keeping with the policies of the hospital, the rules and 
regulations of the Medical Staff, and all applical laws and regulations. 
(3) Dr. Stewart agrees to act as consulant to the hospital administration in 
management decisions concerning the department, and to employ his best efforts in 
promoting the professional and economic integrity of the department. 
(4) Dr. Stewart agrees to provide radiological services as follows: 
(a) Dr. Stewart shall provide in-house services at the hospital during 
normal working hours, each day Monday through Friday of each week. In the 
event Dr. Stewart leaves during the week, he shall provide emergency 
coverage. 
(b) In matters requiring Emergency Room interpretations, on weekends and 
holidays, such interpretive services shall be provided when and if Dr. 
Stewa t is available. 
(c) The radiologist shall provide basic diagnostic services required for 
t-hp rxrp and examination of hospital patients, and subject to the availability 
special diagnostic procedures as may be required oy the medical staff. 
(5) In consideration of the services to be rendered by the radiologist, the 
hospital shall pay to Dr. Stewart, an amount equal to thirth (30) percent of the 
gross hospital charges of x-ray,fluroscopy, plain and computed tomography, nuclear 
medicine,and all other diagnostic imaging services or on the basis that Medicare 
and or Medicaid will pay. Payment shall be made on a monthly basis, payable on 
or before the 15th day^of the month.The amount to be charged for radiological 
services shall be determined by the hospital upon consultation with Dr. Stewart. 
For the first year (12 months) the hospital guarantees a minimum compensation of 
$150, 000. The hospital also acknowledges Dr. Stewart's wishes to be reimbursed 
on a fee - for - service basisin the future. Dr. Stewart will retain that option 
and will inform the hospital of his intentions to exercise that option at least 
three (3) months before that change of reimbursement would take effect. 
(6) The hospital shall furnish such equipment as it shall find, upon consultation 
with Dr. Stewart, is necessary for the proper operation of the department, and 
shall maintain said equipment in proper operating condition. The hospital shall 
also furnish such film, chemicals, stationery, and janitorial and utility services 
as are required for proper operation of the department. 
(7) The hospital shall provide space in the radiology department for the radiologi: 
to render services required of him hereunder. 
(8) In the event of disagreement between the hospital administration and the 
radiologist, over equipment or supplies, a three-man committee comprised of one 
member of the hospital administration, one member of the hospital board and a 
representative of Dr. Stewart or himself, shall meet to solve the disagreement. 
(9) It is understood by all parties that in the rendering of radiology or 
consultation services, hereunder, Dr. Stewart is acting as an independent 
contractor, practicing radiology in all of its forms, as a sub specialty of 
medicine. The hospital shall insist that there not be a conflict of interest. 
The Hospital agrees that for the term of the contract, no radiologist except 
Dr. Stewart or someone appointed by Dr. Stewart, shall render interpretations 
on radiographs, fluroscopy, ultrasounds,plain and computed tomography, mamography, 
nuclear medicine , or any other form of diagnostic imaging. 
(10) Dr. Stewart shall maintain adequate professional liability insurance as 
required under the Medical Staff By-Laws of the hospital. The hospital likewise 
agrees to maintain professional liability insurance covering the operation 
of the department as herein required. 
(11) All applicable provisions of law and other rules and regulations of any and 
all governmental authorities relating to licensure and regulation of physicians and 
hospitals, and to the operation of the department shall be fully complied- with by 
all parties hereto. In addition, the parties shall also operate and conduct the 
department in accordance with the standards and recommendations of the Utah State 
Department of Health, the by-laws of the hospital, the by-laws and rules and 
regulations of the Nedical Staff as may be in effect from time to time. 
(12) The hospital shall grant to Dr. Stewart such staff priviledges in the hospital 
as are available to other physicians, upon compliance by such physicians with rules 
and regulations, and Medical Staff By-laws of the hospital. 
(13) It is understood and agreed that the priviledges herein granted to Dr. Stewart 
are exclusive and may not be granted to other radiologists in accordance with hospital 
rules and regulations. 
(14) It is understood and agreed that this contract may be terminated for the 
following conditions or in the following ways, only: 
(a)for the loss of a liscence to practice in the State of Utah, or; 
(b)for the conviction of a felony, or; 
(c)by the mutual consent of both parties. 
0-5) This agreement constitutes the entire agreement between both parties, and no 
other representatives or provisions of prior contracts shall be binding upon them. 
(16) Should either party default in performance of the terms hereof, the defaulting 
party agrees to pay all costs of enforcement, including court costs and a reasonable 
attorney fee. 
(acknowledgements on the following page) 
AMMENDMENT 
(17) If this agreement is terminated by Wayne T. Stewart, M.D. a minimum of 
ninety (90) days notice will be provided to the hospital in writing. 
<r~> 
Chad Evans, Adminis t ra tor 
Duchesene County Hospi ta l 
Kevin Van T a s s e l l , Chairman 
Duchesene County Hosp i ta l Board 
fd /Z^-li^-L ck^Ltr^C 
/£ Wayne Thomas Stewart, M.D. 
June 24, 1986 
Dated t h i s 6th day of June , 1986. 
r^ 
Chad Evans, Adminis t ra tor 
Duchesne County Hosp i ta l 
Kevin Van T a s s e l l , Chairman 
Duchesne County H o s p i t a l Board 
Wayne' Thomas S tewar t , M.D. 
AMMENDMENT 
This Ammendment describes the Duchesne County Hospital's payment for all 
professional radiological services to Dr. Wayne Stewart for 1992. This is an 
amendment to the 1986 agreement between Dr. Stewart and Duchesne County 
Hospital. 
It is agreed that Dr. Stewart will be provided twenty three payments of 
$17,397.30 beginning January 25, 1992 and on the 10th and 25th of each of the 
following months through December 25, 1992 for a total compensation of 
$400,000. 
His performance will be at a level approximating his past practice and consistent 
with other conditions called out in the 1986 original agreement between 
Duchesne County Hospital and Dr. Stewart. 
This commitment of Duchesne County Hospital is predicated on the assumption 
and condition that the Radiology Department activity (procedures) will at least 
approximate the 1992 departmental forecast and plan. If Duchesne County 
Hospital or physician performance does not meet anticipated levels then the 
original 1986 Agreement between Dr. Stewart and Duchesne County Hospital 
will govern. 
Dated this 15th day of January, 1992. 
/ ' John R. e^jfferies*, Administrator 
L/buchesne County Hospital 
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One-Source Court Reporting 
1 Q So what could you do? 
2 A I could provide a service wherein the 
3 physicians that were not using my services outside of 
4 the hospital would use them. 
5 Q Okay. So you have a certain amount of 
6 physicians out there that aren't necessarily 
7 affiliated with a hospital. You would go and --
8 A I don't think there's really much I could 
9 do. I think it's pretty much contingent on who is 
10 there and what they are doing. If they recruited 
11 another surgeon, my volume goes up. Now, if I am 
12 doing a disservice to my physicians and they feel like 
13 they can't trust my diagnoses and those kind of 
14 things, then they are going to actively request 
15 another pathologist. 
16 Q So you as a pathologist can't necessarily 
17 generate more work, you're relying upon surgeons, for 
18 the most part, requesting your services? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q I want to get back to Exhibit 4 before we 
21 break for lunch. You still have it in front of you. 
22 This is the November 29, 1994 letter agreement or 
23 contract that's at issue in this lawsuit. Do you 
24 personally have an understanding -- let me ask it this 
25 way. What do you believe just cause means? 
78 
A That's easy. That means that the terms of 
the contract aren't being fulfilled. 
Q Give me an example of something that you 
would consider to be just cause to terminate this 
contract. Give me an example if you wanted to 
terminate the contract, what would be just cause? 
Give me an example of something UBMC would do or not 
do that you would consider just cause if you were 
looking to terminate the contract . 
A My answer is anything in here that isn't 
being met, fulfilled. 
Q So, for example, if they stopped paying you 
the laboratory director's fee, that would be just 
cause, right? 
A I'll tell you what it would be. It would be 
to the detriment of the patients, the community, the 
physicians that I serve. That's what it is. 
Q Okay. 
A That's my answer to that question. 
Q Does that answer tell me that just cause 
goes beyond the performance of the language in this 
contract? 
MR. HARRINGTON: I am going to object to 
that. If you want to characterize it or if you want 
to ask him a question, but he's answered your question 
79 
1 same thing? 
2 Q No, I am not asking that question. My 
3 question was simply, it wasn't your creation. It 
4 existed in the contract you were given, right? 
5 A I can't answer yes or no on that, because if 
6 that wouldn't have existed, I'm not going to tell you 
7 I wouldn't have said that exactly the way it was 
8 written or words very closely, worded that same way. 
9 Q It existed, though, right? It's in 
10 Exhibit 3? 
11 A Yes, it's here. 
12 Q That's the language, right? 
13 A Right. 
14 Q In your opinion, then, so long as both sides 
15 are performing the provisions of the agreement, is it 
16 your belief that this contract, then, would exist 
17 perpetually? 
18 A What does perpetually mean? 
19 Q Forever. 
20 A Yes. I wouldn't have said it and I wouldn't 
21 have signed it if I didn't believe it. 
22 Q Okay. You gave me one example of what you 
23 would consider to be just cause for you to terminate 
24 it. Give me an example of just cause for UBMC to 
25 terminate the contract so I get an understanding of 
81 
your interpretation of just cause. 
A Whatever terms that I don't meet. 
Q Okay. You've heard several people testify 
in other depositions, and you have seen a lot of 
writing and so forth during the course of this 
litigation. If UBMC believed that it was in their 
best interest to have an on-site pathologist and that 
would better serve the community, is that just cause 
in your mind? 
A I don't believe they can breach a contract 
to get another pathologist. That's what they did. 
Q Well, the question was, if they believed it 
was in the best interest of UBMC and the community to 
have an on-site pathologist, is that just cause to 
terminate this one? 
A No. 
Q So they would be bound by this contract even 
though the 
A That isn't true. It wasn't in their best 
interest. 
Q No, the question was, if it was in their 
best interest. 
A I am not speculating. I am telling you it 
wasn't in their best interest. 
Q I understand that's your position. 
82 
1 you. I just want to make sure we get some clarity on 
2 the record on a couple of things. 
3 One was a question that Mr. Benard elicited 
4 from you with respect to the just cause provision in 
5 your contract, and he asked you initially if the 
6 contract was then perpetual. Do you remember that? 
7 A Yes, I do. 
8 Q Now, if I give you a definition which is 
9 obtained from Webster's Collegiate Dictionary which 
10 says perpetual means without end, is your contract or 
11 was your contract with UBMC without end? 
12 A No. 
13 Q What would bring that contract to an end? 
14 A If I died or if I went blind or if I fell 
15 into a coma. 
16 Q So in your understanding, then, was your 
17 contract perpetual? 
18 A No. 
19 Q Let me go back and ask you a couple of 
20 questions about the woman doctor you had hired for a 
21 very brief period of time. The separation or the 
22 termination of her working with you, that was done on 
23 the recommendation of counsel; is that correct? 
24 A Yes. 
2 5
 Q Now, there were some questions asked as to 
146 
